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I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy reorganizations' proceed upon a simple premise: creditors'
rights take priority over equity interests.2 If a business is insolvent, then its
owners take nothing. If the business can pay its creditors in full, then its
owners take what remains. This simple dichotomy dissolves, however, if the
business's value can vary with its ownership, or if its present owners dispute
insolvency. In either case, the owners may seek to exploit any uncertainty
in, or dispute over, the value of the business by bargaining for a continued
stake in the reorganized entity.3
Owners may also seek to continue their participation in another way:
they can offer to contribute something new to the business. In this case,
bargaining of a different sort occurs. The parties do not dicker over uncer-
tainties in value; rather, they bargain over the share of the reorganized entity
that the proposed contribution will buy. In this context, owners are similar
to third-party purchasers of the business.
Bankruptcy law, however, makes no clear distinction between the oppor-
tunistic owner who seeks to exploit uncertainty and the legitimate owner
who seeks to buy. Both owners must formulate a plan of reorganization 4
that meets the confirmation requirements of the Bankruptcy Code (the
"Code"). These requirements are numerous, 5 but not complex. 6 They serve
1. Such reorganizations are carried out under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (the
"Code"). 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1330 (1988). Chapter 11 of Title 11, id. §§ 1101-1174, pertains to the
reorganization of debtors, as opposed to their liquidation.
A Chapter 11 case may be supervised either by a trustee or by the debtor. The Code defaults to
debtor control: it states that "'debtor in possession' means debtor." Id. § 1101(1). Debtors in
possession, in turn, "have all the rights... and shall perform all the functions and duties... of a
trustee serving in a case under this chapter." Id. § 1107(a). The debtor in possession's powers
include the ability to continue to operate the debtor's business. Id. § 1108.
2. I use the term "owners" to refer to those entities that, under applicable nonbankruptcy law,
are entitled to any surplus in value from the debtor, once all claims are provided for or paid. In
corporations, the owners are the shareholders; in partnerships, they are the partners. The Code
labels each ownership interest an "equity security." 11 U.S.C. § 101(15) (1988 & Supp. 1939). But
cf Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the
Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHi. L. Rav. 738, 740 n.8 (1988) (defining "owners" to cover any
group that has some claim to the income stream or assets of the debtor).
3. For a discussion of the distortions this kind of bargaining introduces to the reorganization
process, see Baird & Jackson, supra note 2.
4. Plans of reorganization are the vehicle for the adjustment of creditors' and equity holders'
rights and interests. Subchapter II of Chapter 11 provides for plans of reorganization. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1121-1129 (1988). The debtor in possession or trustee is obligated to file a plan "as soon as
practicable." Id. § 1106(a)(5).
5. The thirteen requirements for confirmation of a plan are contained in id. § 1129(a)(1)(13).
6. Some requirements specify what a reorganization plan must include. See, eg., id § 1129(a)
(1) (requiring compliance with Title 11, including the mandatory form requirements listed in
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to ensure that the plan adjusts creditors' rights in a manner consistent with a
financially healthy7 reorganized debtor.8 In turn, the adjustments are sub-
ject to creditor approval. 9
Any adjustments made in a proposed plan are subject to a vote by each
affected creditor class; however, all is not lost if creditors do not approve the
plan. The Code allows a proponent of a plan to confirm it notwithstanding
creditor dissent.10 Nonconsensual confirmation, also known as
"cramdown," 11 first requires that the plan satisfy all other confirmation re-
quirements.12 Then, in lieu of creditor approval, the plan must provide for
"fair and equitable" treatment of any dissenting class of creditors.1 3 In addi-
tion, the plan must not discriminate unfairly with respect to a dissenting
class. 14
The Code does not define "fair and equitable." Congress intended that
the contours of this requirement be shaped by pre-Code history and the indi-
vidualized review of particular cases. 15 In charting these perimeters, courts
have looked to many factors, including the principle that no plan may pay
§ 1123(a)). Others control certain creditor priorities. See eg., id § 1129(a)(9) (specifying cash pay-
ment of administrative claims, and special treatment for certain tax claims).
7. Id. § 1129(a)(I 1). The reorganized debtor's management must also be consistent with credi-
tors' interests, id § 1129(a)(5)(A)(ii), and the plan must at least pay impaired creditors what they
would have received if the debtor were liquidated instead of reorganized, id, § 1129(a)(7).
8. The Code uses the term "debtor" instead of "bankrupt" to refer to the entity that is the
subject of the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. § 101(12). I use the term "reorganized debtor" to refer to
the entity that survives confirmation of the plan. This entity is sometimes referred to as the "re-
vested debtor," since confirmation revests all property of the bankruptcy estate in the debtor or other
entity specified by the plan. Id. § 1141(b).
9. Id § 1129(a)(8). Classes of creditors, not individual creditors, approve a plan. All un-
secured creditors could, for example, comprise one class for approval purposes. Id. § 1122(a) (plan
may include a claim within a class only if it is substantially similar to other claims included in that
class). A class of claims "accepts" a plan if over one-half of the creditors voting approve it, and
those creditors hold at least two-thirds of the amount of claims voting. Id. § 1126(c). A class of
interests accepts whenever holders of at least two-thirds of such interests vote in favor of the plan.
Id. § 1126(d).
10. The power to impose nonconsensual treatment is authorized by 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)
(1988).
11. This power is the subject of much learning and lore. See, eg., Richard F. Broude,
Cramdown and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative, 39 Bus. LAW. 441
(1984); Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bank-
ruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979); Kenneth N. Klee, Cram Down 11, 64 Am. BANKR. L.J.
229 (1990); Isaac M. Pachulski, The Cram Down and Valuation Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 58 N.C. L. REv. 925 (1980).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1988).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Although 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) lists examples of "fair and equitable treatment," this list
was not intended to be exclusive. As indicated at the time Congress considered the Code:
Although many of the factors interpreting "fair and equitable" are specified in paragraph
(2), others, which were explicated in the description of section 1129(b) in the House report,
were omitted from the House amendment to avoid statutory complexity and because they
would undoubtedly be found by a court to be fundamental to 'fair and equitable' treatment
of a dissenting class.
124 CONG. REc. 32,407 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at 34,006 (1978) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini); see also In re Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp., 881 F.2d 1346, 1352 (5th Cir. 1989); Klee, Cram
Down I1 supra note 11, at 230-31.
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any participant more than that participant's claim.' 6 Another, and more
famous factor is the absolute priority rule. 17 This rule prevents owners, as
the most junior claimants, from realizing any value of the reorganizing com-
pany unless creditors consent or are paid in full.' 8 The rule's alternative
conditions of consent or full payment thus prevent owners from retaining
control of bankruptcy debtors unfairly, cheaply, or in derogation of credi-
tors' nonbankruptcy rights. 19
History also supplies a putative exception to the fair and equitable re-
quirement and the absolute priority rule.20 Often called the new value "ex-
ception" to the absolute priority rule,21 this test permits owners to retain
their investment on two conditions. First, they must contribute necessary
new value to the reorganizing debtor. Second, the value of the contribution
must be reasonably equivalent to the value of the interest they will keep.
These new value principles do not require creditor consent-indeed creditor
dissent is assumed-and do not require creditors to receive any minimum
dividend.
This article explores the relationship between the absolute priority rule
and new value principles by first examining the historical origins of the abso-
lute priority rule. It finds that fraudulent transfer law and concepts of lim-
ited investor liability law framed early attempts to create an absolute priority
rule. These doctrines focused on creditors' priority to the debtor's assets.
16. See, eg., In re Evans Products Co., 65 B.R. 870, 875 (S.D. Fla. 1986); see also 124 CONG.
REC. 32,407 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at 34,006 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini)
("For example, a dissenting class should be assured that no senior class receives more than 110
percent of the amount of its claims. While that requirement was explicitly included in the House
bill, the deletion is intended to be one of style and not one of substance.").
17. The absolute priority rule has been the subject of much critical writing. See, eg., John D.
Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REv. 963 (1989); Baird & Jackson,
supra note 2; Walter J. Blum & Stanley A. Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in Corporate
Reorganizations, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 651 (1974); Walter J. Blum, The "Fair and Equitable" Stan-
dard For Confirming Reorganization Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 Am. BANKR. LJ. 165
(1980); Walter J. Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. CHI. L. REV.
565 (1950); James C. Bonbright & Milton M. Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of
Security Holders in a Corporate Reorganization, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 127 (1928).
18. The subtle and far reaching implications of this formulation are discussed from a historical
perspective in Section II of this article. See text accompanying notes 25-135 infra. The impact of the
exact formulation of the rule on modem reorganizations and owner participation is the subject of
Section IV. See text accompanying notes 210-315 infra.
19. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, REP. ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF
THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECrIVE AND REORGANIZATION
COMMITTEES, pt. 8, at 142-56 (1940) [hereinafter cited as SEC REPORT, with an additional indica-
tion of the part and the year published]; GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND
PREFERENCES § 224 (rev. ed. 1940); Blum & Kaplan, supra note 17.
20. The derivation of this formulation is set forth in Section III. See text accompanying notes
136-209 infra.
21. See, eg., Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 203 (1988) (discussing con-
tinuing vitality of" 'exception' or 'modification'" to absolute priority rule); Baird & Jackson, supra
note 2, at 788 & n.104; Ralph A. Peeples, Staying In: Chapter 11, Close Corporations and the Abso-
lute Priority Rule, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 75-78 (1989); see also David M.W. Harvey, Application of
the New Money Exception in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 275 (1991);
Derek J. Meyer, Note, Redefining the New Value Exception to the Absolute Priority Rule in Light of
the Creditors' Bargain Model, 24 IND. L. REV. 417 (1991).
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Building upon this historical base, the article traces the absolute priority
doctrine through two codifications.
The article next examines new value principles. Although many recent
cases22 and commentaries 23 question the wisdom of a new value exception to
absolute priority, this article contends that much of this fuss is misguided.
Examination of the evolution of the absolute priority rule and an analysis of
new value principles demonstrate that these principles are nothing more
than a rough reformulation of the absolute priority rule-albeit a reformula-
tion that is inexplicably tougher on owners. To speak of the new value prin-
ciples as an exception to absolute priority is thus misleading.
Yet, the absence of a true exception to absolute priority does not neces-
sarily exclude owners from the reorganization process when creditors dis-
sent. However one may wish to inveigh against manipulative or exploitative
owners, those who contribute new value should stand on better footing.24
These owners risk additional personal capital, which is a strong index of
good faith.
Both practice and theory give substance to this insight, and support at
least partial inclusion of owners in the process of reorganization. Reorgani-
zation practice illustrates that the presence of competing bidders for a
debtor, whether they are owners or not, tends to increase creditor dividends.
Recent theoretical work on the nature, design, and conduct of auctions sup-
ports this practical insight. This theoretical work asserts that the provision
of maximum information to potential bidders promotes higher revenues to
the seller, which, in the reorganization context, translates into higher credi-
tor dividends. Owners' bids are a significant source of such information. It
not only evidences the owners' belief that the debtor has a positive value, but
also signals the potential amount of this value. In turn, this information
allows nonowners to formulate their own best bids. Moreover, the presence
of an owner sponsored plan and the information it represents tend to stimu-
late competitive bidding. Auction theory suggests that competitive bidding
leads to higher seller revenue, and thus, in the reorganization context, higher
creditor dividends.
The article concludes with an application of fairly simple insights from
auction theory to reorganization practices so as to permit legitimate owner
participation while guarding against owner exploitation. In particular, it
22. See note 154 infra and accompanying text.
23. See, eg., Ayer, supra note 17; Baird & Jackson, supra note 2; Raymond T. Nimmer, Nego-
tiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Priority and New Value Contributions, 36 EMORY
L.J. 1009 (1987); David S. Skeel, The Uncertain State ofAn Unstated Rule" Bankruptcy Contribution
Rule Doctrine After Ahlers, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221 (1989); see also note 21 supra.
24. Indeed, entities that supply new value through purchase money loans or other means re-
ceive preferential treatment in other contexts. See, eg., II U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) (1988) (providing an
exception for otherwise preferential transfers if transferee provides new value to enable debtor to
acquire property); id. § 1110 (providing exception from automatic stay for purchase money equip-
ment lenders to certain utilities); 26 U.S.C. §§ 6323(h)(1), (6) (1988) (providing that lenders or pur-
chasers who part with "money or money's worth" may prevail to the extent of such value, over a
prior tax lien); U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1990) (granting priority to purchase money inventory lenders); id.
§ 9-312(4) (1988) (granting priority to noninventory purchase money lenders).
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seeks to show that promotion of competing plans-from third parties or the
creditors themselves--can create the necessary restraints on owner exploita-
tion. Plans from third parties would provide direct competition to owners,
and would thus check any attempt by owners to exploit. Creditor-sponsored
plans can have a similar effect. Such plans, for example, could allow credi-
tors to exchange their claims against the debtor as consideration for their
competing bid for the firm. Consequently, if creditors do not share the own-
ers' valuation, they may set their own valuation and pay for it through a
credit-bid. The possibility of these competing plans will counterbalance the
owners' ability to capitalize on their position, and ensure that any price paid
in reorganization is a price tested by all interested parties.
II. THE ORIGINS AND CURRENT STATUS OF THE
ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE
A. The Crucible: Fraudulent Transfer Law
The absolute priority rule's origins lie in the intersection between fraudu-
lent transfer law and the rise of the railroad during the nineteenth century.
Rail systems constructed during that period represented huge investments of
capital, 25 including large amounts of secured debt.26 They also represented
a precarious investment: by 1915, almost one-half of American railroads
had defaulted on obligations to their creditors, thus requiring some sort of
financial reorganization. 27 Foreclosure was the traditional enforcement
mechanism for defaults on such secured debt.28 Yet the vast amounts in-
volved, coupled with the pervasiveness of the default problem, rendered fore-
closure virtually ineffective; no one could afford to buy the property at
foreclosure. 29 As a consequence, syndicates of debt holders often faced the
25. As of 1906, over $18 billion of railroad securities were outstanding. WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY,
RAILROADS: FINANCE & ORGANIZATION 62-63 (1915). Over $12 billion of these securities were
held by the public. Id. at 63. Most of the proceeds from the sale of these securities went into the
construction of the railroad system. Id.; see also Albro Martin, Railroads and the Equity Receiver-
ship: An Essay in Institutional Changes, 34 J. ECON. HIST. 685 (1974); Jeffrey Stem, Note, Failed
Markets and Failed Solutions: The Unwitting Formulation of the Corporate Reorganization Tech-
nique, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 783, 784 (1990).
26. As of 1906, railroads had issued over $9 billion of secured debt, of which almost $8 billion
was publicly held. W. RIPLEY, supra note 25, at 63, 105-20.
27. Id. at 374. In 1896, 151 railroads, representing approximately 16% of all railroad mileage,
were in receivership, John Franklin Crowell, Railway Receiverships in the United States, 7 YALE
REv. 319, 319 (Nov. 1898), which was the primary means of debt relief. See note 33 infra and
accompanying text. Estimates of the percentage of mileage under receivership changed little in the
next 20 years. Paul D. Cravath, Reorganization of Corporations, in I SOME LEGAL PHASES OF
CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 153, 154 (1917).
28. See Stem, supra note 25, at 785-87.
29. See James Byrne, The Foreclosure of Railroad Mortgages in the United States Courts in 1
SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION, supra
note 27, at 141 (commenting that "the court and everyone else know that [a) railroad company
cannot possibly get the money to pay what it owes [from a foreclosure sale]; and they know in
ninety-nine cases out of a hundred that there will only be one bidder[, the secured party, at the
foreclosure sale]"); see also Guaranty Trust Co. v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 238 F. 812, 814-15 (E.D. Mo.
1916); Macon & W.R.R. v. Parker, 9 Ga. 377, 389 (1851); GARRARD GLENN, THE LAW Gov-
ERNING LIQUIDATION § 172 (1935); W. RIPLEY, supra note 25, at 127; Stem, supra note 25, at 787.
[V/ol. 44:69
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daunting prospect of running a railroad.30
The inadequacy of foreclosure and sale as a practical remedy to default
gave rise to a new form of debt relief: reorganization.31 Under reorganiza-
tion, railroads continued to operate while their owners and secured creditors
created a new capital structure.32 The primary vehicle for reorganization
was the equity receivership.33 Once initiated, the receivership kept the rail-
road running, and also became the forum in which debts were satisfied. Re-
ceiverships typically satisfied old debt through a plan of reorganization and a
carefully orchestrated foreclosure of the railroad's assets.34 Plans usually
transferred the foreclosed property to a newly created entity, and then pro-
vided for the new entity to issue debt and equity securities to satisfy the old
debt.3 5
Besides the considerable creativity needed to adopt this remedy, certain
practical problems existed. First, the railroads needed managers to operate
their lines.3 6 Second, the railroads, almost by definition, needed additional
30. See, ag., 2 ARTHUR STONE DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 1238-
54 (5th ed. 1953). In Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry., 174 U.S. 674, 678 (1899), the
equity court appointed as its receiver "a gentleman who was the vice president of the company and
its general manager."
31. 2 A.S. DEWING, supra note 30, at 1233-37; Cravath, supra note 27, at 154-56.
Until 1938, the federal bankruptcy scheme was relatively limited in scope, primarily concerned
with the efficient liquidation of debtors' estates. SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co.,
310 U.S. 434, 448 (1940); see also CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNTED STATES HISTORY
(1935). Indeed, from 1789 to 1800, 1802 to 1840, 1843 to 1867, and 1879 to 1898, there was no
federal bankruptcy statute. Notable exceptions to the goal of efficient liquidation were the reorgani-
zation provisions added to the Bankruptcy Act in 1874, Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, 18 Stat. 178,
182-86 (1874) (repealed 1878), as well as the composition provisions found in § 12 of the 1898 Act,
11 U.S.C. § 30 (repealed 1938). The deficiencies of the 1874 amendments are noted in C. WARREN,
supra, at 122-28. The practical problems with the § 12 compositions were set forth in SEC REPORT,
supra note 19, pt. 8, at 72-82 (1940).
32. SEC REPORT, supra note 19, pt. 8, at 37-47 (1940); Byrne, supra note 29, at 93-96.
33. See CHARLES FISK BEACH, JR., COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF RECEIVERS at v (New
York, L.K. Strouse 1891) (stating that railway receiverships were "essentially American," and dat-
ing their rise to the 25-year period preceding 1887). English practice resisted imposing receiverships
upon bankrupt railways due to the absence of authorizing legislation. Id § 325; see also WILLIAM
WILLIAMSON KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE AS TO RECEIVERS APPOINTED BY
THE COURT OF CHANCERY 66 (Geo. Tucker Bispham ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, Kay & Brother,
1877) (finding receivership an inappropriate remedy when debtor operated under public charter or
some other legislative grant).
34. 2 A.S. DEWING, supra note 30, at 1288-90; Byrne, supra note 29, at 93-96; Stern, supra
note 25, at 791-94.
35. Reorganization managers accomplished many goals through their plan. A plan created a
new company which would be controlled by the old bondholders. It also transferred the mortgaged
assets to that company and established the remainder of the new company's capital structure. The
new capital structure, however, took as its starting point the structure of the company in receiver-
ship. The bonds issued carried a reduced debt service through debt forgiveness and below-market
terms. In addition, old shareholders often subscribed for new equity shares at prices pegged as
additional "assessments" on their original shares. The funds raised from these assessments served
several purposes. First, the funds paid administrative expenses, including lawyers' fees. The next
payments were made to satisfy dissenting bondholders. Finally, the new railroad company used any
remaining funds as its initial working capital. For more elaboration, see 2 A.S. DEWING, supra note
30, at 1288-97; Cravath, supra note 27, at 175-81; Robert T. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations:
Certain Developments of the Last Decade, 27 COLUM. L. REv. 901 (1927).
36. SEC REPORT, supra note 19, pt. 8, at 33 (1940); Cravath, supra note 27, at 157-61 (under-
scoring need for competent and sympathetic receivers).
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cash to continue providing services. 37 Notwithstanding the scarcity of these
essentials, at least one identifiable group-the stockholders-possessed both
resources. Stockholders were often willing to contribute new cash to save
their investment. 38 In addition, these same shareholders or their agents were
often in a better position to manage operations. 39
Thus arose an alliance between bondholders and stockholders. Bond-
holders would initiate equity receiverships with the goal of a judicial sale of
the road pursuant to the bondholders' mortgage; shareholders, or their prox-
ies, would run the railroad. 4° This alliance did not end with foreclosure, and
the reorganization plan would often provide for the new entity to issue se-
curities to the old equity holders upon contribution of a stated price.4 1 In
practice, the new money not only saved an old investment, but the contribu-
tions were structured so that the securities received were often worth more
than the amount contributed to the reorganization. 42
Foreclosure not only discharged the old secured debt, but drastically af-
fected existing unsecured debt. Since the old line's assets typically were sub-
ject to the creditors' mortgage, foreclosure removed from the reach of the
unsecured creditors all property that could have been used to satisfy their
claims. Unsecured creditors were squeezed out and given nothing. 43
Not surprisingly, unsecured creditors resisted the elimination of their
claims during foreclosure. Using fraudulent conveyance law,44 they at-
tacked the validity of foreclosure transactions. 45 Several aspects of fraudu-
lent conveyance law made using it attractive. At common law, a fraudulent
conveyance occurred whenever a transfer was made with the intent to hin-
der, delay, or defraud creditors.46 The alliance between bondholders and
37. Swaine, supra note 35, at 918-19. Courts often required "the railroad receiverships to pay
[certain] pre-receivership claims prior to reorganization." Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances F.
Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity and Its Parameters, 73 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 3 (1989).
38. Swaine, supra note 35, at 915.
39. As noted in the SEC REPORT, supra note 19, pt. 8, at 33 (1940), 59% of all railroad
receivers were affiliated with the debtor either as owners or as officers.
40. W. RIPLEY, supra note 25, at 127.
41. Cravath, supra note 27, at 181-98; see also note 11 supra.
42. See, eg., Swaine, supra note 35, at 914-17.
43. See, eg., Chicago Rock Island & Pac. R.R. v. Howard, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 392 (1868) (ex-
isting bondholders, who would not have been fully satisfied by foreclosure agreed to give sharehold-
ers 16% of the bonds of new operating company as consideration for shareholders' approval of sale
of old railroad to an interested purchaser, whereby unsecured creditors were not considered or
compensated).
44. Courts and commentators have recently renamed this body of law. Originally known as
fraudulent conveyance law, see G. GLENN, supra note 19, § 195, the area is now referred to as fraud-
ulent transfer law, because it covers obligations as well as conveyances. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988)
(referring to fraudulent transfers). Compare Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (1918) (emphasis
added) with Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (1984) (emphasis added).
45. See, e.g., Howard, 74 U.S. at 405. In Howard, before the distribution of the bonds, un-
secured creditors used a fraudulent conveyance theory to lay claim to undistributed shareholders'
bonds in the new company. These creditors alleged that the foreclosure was collusive, id., and that
the bonds, as proceeds of the assets of the old railroad, belonged to creditors, not shareholders, id at
409.
46. Transfers made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors had been illegal since
at least 1571. 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571) (Eng.), repealed by The Law of Property Act, 15 Geo. 5, ch. 20,
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shareholders during railroad reorganizations could thus be characterized as
a scheme to unfairly eliminate unsecured claims, which hindered, delayed,
and defrauded those creditors.47 The alliance produced a new company
with the same shareholders, the same bondholders, and the same property.
The only aspect missing was unsecured and other junior debt. Moreover,
then-existing common law recognized that judicial procedures such as levy
and execution could be unfairly and intentionally manipulated to eliminate
unsecured debt. The abuse of these procedures could also be characterized as
a fraudulent conveyance. 48 Finally, the remedies afforded under fraudulent
conveyance law fit; creditors could ignore a court-approved foreclosure and
levy upon the railroad's assets held by the new owners.49 The combination
of these factors allowed unsecured creditors to challenge the procedure used
by reference to the result it achieved; their argument, plainly stated, was
this: "why should shareholders take anything when we receive nothing?" 50
§ 172 sched. 6 (1925) (Eng.). For a short background, see Bruce A. Markell, Toward True and Plain
Dealing: A Theory of Fraudulent Transfers Involving Unreasonably Small Capital, 21 IND. L. REv.
469, 473-75 (1988). A more extensive account is set forth in 1 G. GLENN, supra note 19, §§ 58-62b.
47. Again, the Howard analysis provides an example: Since the debtor had sold the property,
the Court felt that any proceeds not used to discharge the lien constituted "a fund in trust for the
benefit of [the debtor's] creditors." Howard, 74 U.S. at 414. Moreover, diversion of the proceeds of
this fund to stockholders before all debts had been paid was a form of fraudulent transfer. As stated
by the Court without citation, "the rule is well settled that stockholders are not entitled to any share
of the capital stock nor to any dividend of the profits until all debts of the corporation are paid." Id.
at 409-10. See also Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry., 174 U.S. 674, 689 (1899)
(directing lower court, on remand, not to approve foreclosure sale "until the interests of the un-
secured creditors have been preserved").
48. See, eg., Crary v. Sprague & Craw, 12 Wend. 41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834) (fraudulently ob-
tained execution and sale of goods cannot defeat rights of purchaser who bought after levy); United
States v. Conyngham, 25 F. Cas. 599 (C.C.D. Pa. 1801) (No. 14,850) (debtor's continued possession
of household goods for 13 months after levy held fraudulent, leaving the goods available for subse-
quent execution); West v. Skip, 27 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1010 (Ch. 1749) (debtor's retention of assets after
levy constituted a species of fraud notwithstanding the regularity of the procedure involved; conse-
quently, execution creditor who allowed the debtor to maintain possession lost priority to later levy-
ing creditor); see also ORLANDO BUMP, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANcES 507-08 (2d ed. 1876); 1 G.
GLENN, supra note 19, § 214b; Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944)
(creating the trust fund theory of liability to creditors). Dewing cites Wood as "the first important
legal precedent" in equity receivership theory. 2 A.S. DEWING, supra note 30, at 1237 n.p.
Other authorities have analyzed the early origins of the absolute priority rule. See William O.
Douglas & Jerome Frank, Landlords' Claims in Reorganizations, 42 YALE L.J. 1003, 1009-41
(1933); Jerome N. Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganization,
19 VA. L. REv. 541, 547-60 (1933); see also SEC REPORT, supra note 19, pt. 8, at 52-60 (1940).
Legal scholars also noted this problem long before courts had developed rules on the matter. See,
eg., C.F. BEACH, supra note 33, § 327, at 265-66.
49. See, eg., Bethel v. Stanhope, 78 Eng. Rep. 1037, 1038 (Q.B. 1599); Mannocke's Case, 73
Eng. Rep. 661 (Q.B. 1571).
50. Bondholders and shareholders responded with an argument based upon procedural stand-
ing and contractual freedom. Since the encumbered assets were insufficient to satisfy the bondhold-
ers, unsecured creditors who lacked standing to challenge the foreclosure, even if they prevailed,
would get nothing. Further, bondholders had the right to give their assets to the old shareholders
after they had foreclosed. A modem form of this argument appears in Baird & Jackson, supra note
2, at 742-44.
The Supreme Court responded directly to these arguments in Louisville Trust Co., 174 U.S. 674
(1899). Against the background of a fraudulent conveyance challenge, id. at 679, the court rejected
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B. From Fraudulent Transfer Law to "Fixed Principles" and Fair Offers
Although the Supreme Court recognized the primacy of creditors' rights
and the legitimacy of fraudulent conveyance attacks as early as 1868,51
bondholders and stockholders continued to ignore the rights of unsecured
creditors by adopting reorganization plans that excluded these creditors.52
In 1913, the Court reemphasized its concerns regarding priority in Northern
Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd.53 After Boyd, reorganizations would never be
the same.
Boyd considered the validity of receivership of the Northern Pacific Rail-
road Company, which had earlier defaulted on its secured bonds during the
railroad panic of 1893. 54 After a consensual receivership for the Railroad
was initiated in 1893,55 holders of the bonded indebtedness foreclosed56 us-
ing the procedure already described above.57 The approved plan of reorgani-
zation transferred the Railroad's assets to the newly organized Northern
Pacific Railway Company.58 As part of this reorganization plan, common
shareholders of the Railroad could subscribe to common stock of the Rail-
way upon payment of assessments equal to $15 for every $100 of original par
value stock in the Railroad held. Preferred shareholders of the Railroad re-
ceived $50 each of new preferred and common stock for an assessment of
$10 on every $100 of original value.59
the standing and contractual freedom arguments, stating that "a court . . . can never rightfully
become the mere silent register of the agreements of mortgagee and mortgagor," id. at 688-89.
The division of consideration was probably one of the factors which led the Court to refuse to
validate the foreclosure. As set forth in the case on remand, former preferred shareholders received
a priority right to subscribe to $100 worth of new common stock and $7.50 of new preferred upon
surrender of $100 old preferred and payment of $7.50. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Louisville,
N.A. & C. Ry., 103 F. 110, 127 (C.C.D. Ind. 1900). Holders of old common received a similar right
to subscribe; they could receive $100 of new common and $7.50 of new preferred upon surrender of
$300 of old common stock and payment of $7.50. Id. Since the old equity securities were practically
worthless-five months after the initiation of the receivership the common was trading for "a frac-
tion of a cent" per share, and the preferred was trading at 1 to 2 cents per share, id. at 128-the
exchange was quite a bargain for the equity holders.
The Supreme Court instructed the lower court to examine the transaction more closely for the
fraud hinted at by this disparity. On remand, the trial judge seemingly took umbrage at the Supreme
Court's intimations that he had not properly discharged his duties. See id. at 118-20. At any rate,
the judge adopted the master's report, id. at 128, which explicitly found that there "was no fraud or
fraudulent intent or fraudulent conspiracy on the part of the [bondholders'] trustees, the bondhold-
ers, the bondholders' committee, the stockholders or [the debtor]." Id. at 112.
51. Howard, 74 U.S. at 392. Note, however, that receiverships as vehicles for railroad reorgan-
ization appeared as early as the 1850s. Stem, supra note 25, at 792-94 (discussing Macon & W.R.R.
v. Parker, 9 Ga. 377 (1851)). See also 2 A.S. DEWING, supra note 30, at 1239-42.
52. SEC REPORT, supra note 19, pt. 8, at 48-49 (1940).
53. 228 U.S. 482 (1913). As already noted, by that time almost a majority of railroads had
undergone some form of financial reorganization. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
54. 228 U.S. at 487; STUART DAGGETr, RAILROAD REORGANIZATION 289 (1908).
55. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 487.
56. Id. at 487-90. Although the Court authorized the sale of the Railroad's unencumbered
property in its decree of foreclosure entered in 1896, the property was not sold and the securities of
the Railway Company were not issued until 1899. Id. at 491.
57. See text accompanying notes 31-35 supra.
58. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 488.
59. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 488-89; S. DAGGETT, supra note 54, at 303, 305, 353.
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The reorganization plan did not provide for Boyd or any other unsecured
creditor: The court-approved upset price was less than the total amount of
secured indebtedness. Indeed, the Court noted that the reorganization
court, in a prior suit brought by other unsecured creditors, had found that
"there was no equity in the property out of which unsecured creditors could
be paid." 60
Boyd sued both the Railroad and the Railway for debts owed to him by a
company acquired by the Railroad in 1888 in what today would be called a
leveraged buyout. The Railroad purchased a majority of the stock of Boyd's
debtor, then immediately caused its new subsidiary to borrow funds against
the subsidiary's assets. The proceeds of this transaction were, in one way or
another, used to satisfy the acquisition debt.61
Relying on fraudulent conveyance law,62 Boyd alleged that the Railway
was liable in equity for the unpaid debts of the Railroad's subsidiary. 63 The
Supreme Court agreed, holding that equity would not allow an alliance of
secured creditors and shareholders to eliminate unsecured debts such as
Boyd's. 4 In this respect, the Court continued to apply fraudulent convey-
ance law.65 Indeed, much of the Court's description of the effect of the reor-
ganization is crafted in traditional fraudulent conveyance language.66 If
issued today, the opinion would probably be analyzed as another unexcep-
tional "successor liability" case applying the "mere continuation" theory of
fraudulent transfer or bulk transfer liability.67 In short, the Court did not
60. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 490. The suit was Paton v. Northern Pac. R.R., 85 F. 838 (C.C.E.D.
Wisc. 1896).
61. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 499-500.
62. Id. at 501. The arguments of counsel for the Railway make clear that Boyd alleged that the
sale of the Railroad's assets to the Railway was fraudulent as to his claim against the Railroad. See
id at 493-97.
63. Id. at 501.
64. Id at 503-08.
65. See note 48 supra. The Court also cited Howard and Louisville Trust as relevant authori-
ties. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 504-05. Similar fact patterns still arise. See, eg., Voest-Alpine Trading USA
Corp. v. Vantage Steel Corp., 919 F.2d 206 (3d Cir. 1990).
66. The Court stated that:
[a]s between the parties and the public generally, the [foreclosure] sale was valid. As
against creditors, it was a mere form.... The property in the hands of the former owners,
under a new charter, was as much subject to any existing liability as that of a defendant
who buys his own property at a tax sale.
Boyd, 228 U.S. at 506-07; see also 1 G. GLENN, supra note 19, § 224.
67. As with many strands of fraudulent conveyance law, this particular type of fraud has
spawned its own jurisprudence. According to the modem "mere continuation" theory of fraudulent
conveyances, shareholders cannot cause corporations to sell assets to a new entity that they own, and
use the fiction of a new corporation to defeat creditor claims. In short, liability follows the assets.
See, eg., Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 29, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1977); Stanford Hotel
Co. v. M. Schwind Co., 180 Cal. 348, 354, 181 P. 780 (1919); see also Weaver v. Nash Int'l, Inc., 562
F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Iowa 1983) (summary judgment granting finding of no successor liability where
new company did not have same shareholders of old company, but in which 3 of 7 directors re-
mained, and all 7 officers continued in identical offices, with only 4 new offices created); cf Pringle v.
Hunsicker, 154 Cal. App. 2d 789, 793, 316 P.2d 742 (1957) (stating that "infusion of new blood into
the business through investments by outsiders precludes the application of the ['mere continuation'
theory]"). In some states, such as Michigan and New Hampshire, the "mere continuation" theory
has been expanded to relax the requirement of a substantial identity of shareholders, officers, and
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focus upon the amount of unpaid claims, but upon the amount of the assets
diverted to junior interests.
The Court also had to deal with the contention that even a "fair plan"
would not have distributed anything to unsecured creditors.68 After all, the
court-approved upset price of $61,000,000 was less than one-half of the se-
cured indebtedness of $157,000,000.69 The Court rejected the argument that
the stated evidence of value established that Boyd, as an unsatisfied un-
secured creditor, had no standing because of the Railroad's insolvency. As it
saw the issue: "The invalidity of the sale flowed from the character of the
reorganization agreement regardless of the value of the property .... ,,70 The
Court found this proposition to be a "fixed principle, ' 71 not affected in any
way by the allegation of a lack of value for unsecured creditors.
By forcing shareholders to pay creditors in full, even if there were insuffi-
cient corporate assets, the Court attempted to allay concerns that its holding
would violate the principle of limited liability. It stated that its holding did
not "require the impossible, and make it necessary to pay an unsecured cred-
itor in cash."'72 Rather, reorganization plans could extend payment by issu-
ing income bonds (debt instruments with contingent interest provisions) or
equity securities as long as the value of the securities issued was set on "equi-
table terms."'73
What were "equitable terms"? The Court gave little guidance. As noted
above, the Court did say that full payment in cash was not required.74 The
Court, however, was aware of the converse to limited liability. Upon insol-
vency and liquidation, shareholders forfeit their capital; all value flowing
from the initial capital belongs to creditors of an insolvent company. Share-
holders could not, in equity at least, derive any benefit from their risk capital
so long as creditors were left unpaid.
[Thus, i]f the value of the road justified the issuance of stock in exchange for
old shares, the creditors were entitled to the benefit of that value, whether it
was present or prospective, for dividends or only for purposes of control. In
either event it was a right of property out of which the creditors were enti-
tled to be paid before the stockholders could retain it for any purpose
whatever.75
In short, the right to be paid first, from shareholders' capital contributions
or their proceeds, was a "right of property" inuring to the benefit of the
creditors.
directors. Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976); see Cyr v. B.
Offen & Co., Inc., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying New Hampshire law).
68. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 507-08. A prior lawsuit which had raised this point also sounded in
fraudulent conveyance theories, and had been dismissed. See note 60 supra.
69. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 507.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 508.
73. Id.
74. Id. This decision was necessary to preserve shareholders' limited liability.
75. Id.
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In Boyd the Court looked to the value the parties placed on the Railroad,
not that determined by the trial court, to decide whether "the value of the
road justified the issuance of stock."'76 Because the Railway immediately
issued $190,000,000 in bonds and $155,000,000 in stock upon receipt of the
$61,000,000 the Court did not believe that the upset price was a fair price.77
The reorganization diverted value to shareholders through the option to con-
tinue to participate at a favorable price. Not extending this option in some
form to unsecured creditors violated those creditors' "property" right to re-
ceive priority in any distribution of corporate assets.
But if reorganization extended the "value of the road" to creditors on
"equitable terms," could plan proponents exclude dissenting creditors? Eq-
uity provided no firm answer. 78 The Court's solution sounded in waiver and
estoppel: "If [the creditor] declines a fair offer he is left to protect himself as
any other creditor of a judgment debtor, and, having refused to come into a
just reorganization, could not thereafter be heard in a court of equity to
attack it."'79 In other words, upon declining a fair offer, the creditor was
estopped from challenging the reorganization. Thereafter, the only recourse
would be to sue to collect from the execution-proof former shell.
Boyd thus stands for two closely aligned principles. First, continued
shareholder participation in the reorganized debtor creates a presumption of
collusion sufficient to permit successor liability. The Court called this pre-
sumption a "fixed principle" that operates regardless of the estimated value
of the debtor's property.80 Second, reorganization managers could dispel
this presumption by promulgating a fair offer to all creditors.81 So long as a
fair offer made any existing value available to all participants, courts would
respect the reorganization and its effect on unsecured creditors. Boyd thus
created a procedural device to avoid judicial entanglement in substantive
evaluations of value.
Boyd notwithstanding, reorganizations of all stripes continued with the
participation of equity owners.82 Many attempted to avoid Boyd by offering
76. Id. This may be the classic example of plan proponents using liquidation value to eliminate
a class, and then using going concern value to allocate the remaining interests among themselves.
77. Id. at 507.
78. Until the widespread acceptance of American Steel Foundries v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry.,
231 F. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), receiverships typically ended with foreclosure. Foreclosure preserved
the fiction that the sale extinguished the unsecured creditors' debts. In American Steel, the judge
dispensed with this fiction, and allowed the reorganized debtor to operate under its old charter. Id.
at 1003-04; 2 ARTHUR STONE DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 1346 ns (4th
ed. 1941). The American Steel opinion became the subject of much discussion, see, e.g., id. at 1347
nn.s & 41, until the discharge provisions of Sections 77 and 77B effectively mooted the issue.
79. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 508 (1913).
80. Id. at 507.
81. Id. at 508.
82. One of the first, and the most lasting, responses to Boyd arose in the reorganization of the
St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad. There, Judge Sanborn initially understood Boyd to require all-
cash payments to unsecured creditors, but after "three days of friendly debate in his chambers," he
relented and allowed old equity holders to purchase new shares in the reorganized company. 2
ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS, 1819-1948, at 172 (1948).
Their participation, however, was conditioned on the plan's provision of a "fair and timely offer of
participation" in the reorganized company to unsecured creditors. Id. at 173 (quoting Judge
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holders of unsecured debt the ability to subscribe, along with holders of eq-
uity securities, to the securities issued by the new company. Necessity
played a role in this trend: reorganizing companies needed operating capital,
and equity holders were perceived as the most likely source. In 1926, the
Supreme Court, recognizing this need for capital, appeared to endorse such
efforts, while at least facially reaffirming Boyd's two key principles.8 3
Although the Boyd court tried to avoid making substantive determina-
tions of value, it failed to offer much guidance on just what constituted a
"fair offer." After weak attempts by the Court to give meaning to the
term,84 two different conceptions of fair offers eventually arose.85 The first
theory, known generically as "relative priority," did not require allocating
participation rights according to the full amount of prereceivership claims.
Instead, it adjusted capital structure on the basis of entitlement to future
income, assuming no acceleration of senior debt. Equity holders could par-
ticipate only if the projected earnings of the reorganized company exceeded
pre-receivership debt service. Under the relative priority theory, therefore,
shareholders who contributed new value through paid assessments could sal-
vage at least some of their original investment.86
Unsecured and other junior creditors pressed for a different interpreta-
tion of the "fair offer" principle announced in Boyd. Their alternative,
known as "absolute priority," rejected allocations of participation rights
based on income entitlement. Instead, it set priority according to the full
amount of a creditor's state law entitlement upon liquidation.87 Thus, junior
classes could participate only when the reorganization plan allocated values
in accordance with their state law entitlement. In contrast to a relative pri-
ority system, absolute priority granted the excess of market value over any
assessments paid to the creditors, not to the shareholders.
The stakes were high. Reorganization managers believed that the securi-
ties issued in a reorganization had to have an initial market value greater
than the associated assessment to induce shareholders to pay the assess-
Sanborn's decree). The plan's provisions were later upheld against collateral attack. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. v. McElvain, 253 F. 123 (E.D. Mo. 1918).
83. Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445 (1926). In Kansas
City Terminal, the Court noted that "additional funds will be essential to the success of the [reorgan-
ization], and it may be impossible to obtain them unless stockholders are permitted to contribute."
Id. at 455 (dicta). The Court, however, also made statements which parroted Boyd. In particular, it
stated that creditors possessed an "equitable right to be preferred to stockholders against the full
value of all property belonging to the debtor corporation," and that if a fair offer was made and
refused, "[creditors could not] attack the reorganization in a court of equity." Kansas City Termi-
nal 271 U.S. at 454-55.
That Kansas City Terminal is unsatisfactory on many counts is set forth in Ayer, supra note 17,
at 1001-07.
84. See Kansas City Terminal, 271 U.S. at 456.
85. The article fixing the terminology "relative priority" and "absolute priority" is Bonbright
& Bergerman, supra note 17, at 127.
86. Often the value of such securities when issued exceeded the amount of the assessment. 2
A.S. DEWING, supra note 30, at 1395; Swaine, supra note 35, at 914-15. Proponents of this view
justified it on the basis that the new value created the excess value. See, eg., id. at 916.
87. See Bonbright & Bergerman, supra note 17, at 127.
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ments.88 Eliminating liability for unsecured creditors was one means of en-
suring higher value. Owners thus contributed hundreds of millions of
dollars on the assumption that the receivership vehicle extinguished un-
secured creditors' debts.
The debate continued as the Depression pushed increasing numbers of
companies into receivership. 89 Given the ad hoc development of reorganiza-
tion powers, administration was not uniform. Thus, in 1933 and 1934, Con-
gress responded to the problems by adding Sections 77 and 77B 9° to the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the "Act") 91 as reorganization devices. Both stat-
utes incorporated most of the features of equity receiverships. But both went
further: they explicitly allowed courts to bind dissenting minorities to the
terms of a confirmed plan.92
In addition, Sections 77 and 77B each required judicial findings that pro-
posed plans be "fair and equitable" before a plan could be confirmed.93
Moreover, this requirement applied to each creditor.94 Contrary to what
one might think, the statute's requirement did not deter reorganization prac-
tice. Proponents of relative priority believed the language of the statute al-
lowed business as usual: continued equity participation through
assessments, which preserved some value at the expense of senior creditors.
95
As seen below, other creditors did not share this view.
88. As stated by Robert T. Swaine, if such excess values could not be assured, "successful
corporate reorganizations [would be] impossible." Swaine, supra note 35, at 915; see also 2 A.S.
DEWING, supra note 30, at 1395; note 86 supra.
89. 2 A.S. DEWING, supra note 30, at 1234 & n.i.
90. Section 77 provided for relief for railroad corporations. Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204,
§ 77, 47 Stat. 1467, 1474 (1933). Section 77B, enacted a year later, applied to other corporations.
Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911, 912 (1934).
91. Act of July 1, 1898, Pub. L. 55-171, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1979) [hereinafter Act].
92. Under Section 77, unsecured debts were discharged to the extent that "two-thirds in
amount of such creditors shall have accepted the plan in writing." Act of March 3, 1933 § 77(h)(6).
If a majority of creditors voted for a plan, then their motives, however selfish, controlled. Under
Section 77B, the confirmation of a plan discharged "all creditors, secured or unsecured," id
§ 77B(g)(3) (repealed 1938), but confirmation required the vote of two-thirds of each creditor class
affected. Act of June 7, 1934, § 77B(e)(l) (repealed 1938).
93. Section 77, as originally enacted, did not state that the plan had to be "fair and equitable."
Rather, it stated that the plan had to be "equitable." Act of March 3, 1933 ch. 204, § 77(g), 47 Stat.
1467, 1479 (1933). It was not until 1935, after the adoption of Section 77B, that the words "fair
and" were inserted before "equitable." Act of Aug. 27, 1935, ch. 774, § 77(e)(1), 49 Stat. 911, 918
(1935).
94. Section 77B explicitly allowed courts to override the creditors' vote. This seemed at odds
with the explicit deference to majoritarian rule in § 77, see note 92 supra, and effectively shifted the
focus from a fair offer, as judged by the collective self interest of creditors as a class, to a "fair"
distribution, as judged by state law priorities.
95. In Downtown Inv. Co. v. Boston Metro. Bldgs., Inc., 81 F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1936), the court
held that Section 77B did not incorporate the absolute priority rule and affirmed a plan based upon
relative priorities. Other early cases seemed to discard absolute priority, but are of limited value due
to the lack of objections raised or the brevity of discussion by the courts. See, e.g., In re A.C. Hotel
Co., 93 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1937); In re Peyton Realty Co., 18 F. Supp. 822 (E.D. Pa. 1936); In re
Burns Bros., 14 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
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C. From Fair Offers to "Fair and Equitable" Plans: The First
Codification
The issue of which standard, relative or absolute priority, should govern
was squarely presented to the Supreme Court in 1939 by Thomas K. Case.96
The debtor company had filed under Section 77B of the Act, proposing a
plan of reorganization according to which existing shareholders would retain
23 percent of the common equity for no additional monetary consideration.
Under the terms of the plan, bondholders such as Case would receive the
remainder of the common shares, plus certain preferred shares.
The case directly challenged the Court to chose between the relative and
absolute priority principles. The stock issuance, together with certain divi-
dend restrictions on the stock issued, preserved relative priorities. 97 Under
the absolute priority standard, however, the plan failed miserably. The
debtor's principal assets were worth approximately $830,000, and a first
mortgage was outstanding of more than $3,800,000.98
The Court, speaking through its newest Justice, William 0. Douglas,99
construed the statute's use of "fair and equitable" to incorporate the abso-
lute priority standard. Justice Douglas did not even see much of an issue.
He stated the "words 'fair and equitable' ... are words of art which prior to
the advent of § 77B had acquired a fixed meaning through judicial interpre-
tations in the field of equity receivership reorganizations." 10( Absolute pri-
ority and Case prevailed. 101
This pronouncement completed the transformation from fair offers to
fair distributions. Case supplanted Boyd's procedural test with a substantive
requirement: all plans must honor state law entitlements. Moreover, aggre-
gate creditor preferences were no longer a sufficient basis for reorganization.
96. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
97. Id. at 119-20.
98. Id
99. Justice Douglas was appointed in the spring of 1939; Case was argued on October 18, 1939.
The decision was handed down on November 6, 1939.
100. Case, 308 U.S. at 115. To illustrate that meaning, Justice Douglas quoted extensively
from Howard, Louisville Trust Co., Boyd, and Kansas City Terminal. See id. at 116-20.
101. Id. at 118-19. Case's victory was initially hollow. Before the Court's decision, Case de-
manded to be paid in cash, including all accrued interest and expenses. 2 A.S. DEWING, supra note
30, at 1304 n.h. So irritating was Case that the debtor's employees scraped together a fund of
$28,000 to buy peace and continue the debtor's operations; since this was less than the $36,000 he
thought he was owed, Case refused to accept it. Id. at 1305 n.h.
On remand, the debtor proposed a new plan, which canceled all bond debt, and issued new
equity in the debtor pro rata with the amount of outstanding debt. Under the debtor's plan, Case
received 5,238 shares, or .61%, of the 859,628 shares of common stock issued. Since Case held only
$13,500 in bonds, he was transformed from a creditor holding $13,500 in bonds into a minority
shareholder. See id. at 1309 n.o.
Case may have had the last laugh, however. The debtor's main asset was a dockyard in Los
Angeles. Case, 308 U.S. at 109. With the advent of World War II, the debtor acquired a backlog of
defense contracts. The debtor's value thus rose sharply to $4 per share. 2 A.S. DEWING, supra note
30 at 1309 n.o. Case thus could have sold his stock in the early 1940s for almost $21,000, more than
the principal amount of his original bonds. In any event, the debtor was acquired in 1946, and
liquidated soon thereafter. Id. at 1309.
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The application of the fair and equitable standard had to occur on a creditor
by creditor basis.
The Court, in a series of cases in the early 1940s,102 quickly confirmed
that Case's interpretation of "fair and equitable" governed Section 77 rail-
road reorganization cases10 3 and Chapter X104 reorganizations. In these
cases, the Court also illuminated the nature of the creditors' entitlement
under the absolute priority rule.
As stated above, Case required reorganization plans to respect state law
entitlements. But the decision failed to clarify which state law entitlements
were critical. One possibility was that only liquidation priorities were to be
respected. According to this view, creditors maintained priority only over
what they would have received if there were a quick liquidation sale. An
alternative theory accorded priority equal to the full amount of the creditors'
claims; creditors previously extended capital to the entity, and thus were
entitled to receive at least that much.
The answer to this problem lay between these two polar extremes. Liqui-
dation values as a basis for priority were inapposite as they defeated one of
reorganization's basic goals, that of preserving the debtor as a going con-
cern. 105 Priority equal to the full value of creditors' claims ran into trouble
as well. The origins of the absolute priority rule lay in fraudulent convey-
ance law, and that body of decisions focused on the value of the debtor's
assets.10 6 Reorganizations ultimately adopted this historical view, allocating
to creditors a priority equal to all of the value that existed, rather than the
amount of all claims, or a value which could be obtained quickly but with
sacrifice.°10 7 Under this view, once the debtor's value was allocated to credi-
tors, reorganization extinguished all unsatisfied claims.108 Consistent with
102. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St.P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943);
Marine Harbor Properties, Inc. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78 (1942); Consolidated Rock
Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
103. Group of Institutional Investors, 318 U.S. at 542.
104. Marine Harbor Props., 317 U.S. at 85.
105. See, eg., HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION, H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 223 (1977) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 595].
106. See generally G. GLENN, supra note 19, at §§ 56-57.
107. See also Group ofInstitutional Investors, 318 U.S. at 541-42 ("The issue involved in such a
determination [that the stock had no value] is whether there is a reasonable probability that the
earning power of the road will be sufficient to pay prior claims of interest and principal and leave some
surplus for the service of the stock.") (emphasis added); Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois,
312 U.S. 510, 529 (1941) ("As indicated in the Boyd case, the creditors are entitled to have the full
value of the property, whether 'present or prospective, for dividends or only for purposes of control,'
first appropriated to payment of their claims.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added); Kansas City
Terminal Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445, 454 (1926) ("Unsecured creditors of insol-
vent corporations are entitled to the benefit of the values which remain after lienholders are satisfied,
whether this is present or prospective, for dividends or only for purposes of control."); Northern
Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 508 (1913) ("[Ihe creditors [are] entitled to the benefit of that
value, whether it was present or prospective, for dividends or only for purposes of control.").
108. In re 620 Church St. Bldg. Corp., 299 U.S. 24, 27 (1936) (under Section 77B, reorganiza-
tion plan which allocated all value to first lienholders extinguished "whatever interest petitioners
may have [had] as junior lienors under the Illinois law").
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concepts of limited liability, owners' separate assets were never at risk to
augment the funds available to creditors.
Although the principle of allocation was set, the mechanics for its imple-
mentation were not. Boyd hinted at a partial answer by implicating that
income bonds or preferred stock could be used as vehicles to distribute
value. 109 Other methods existed, most notably regular debt instruments. It
was not until Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St Paul
& Pacific Railroad,110 however, that the scope of this principle became
somewhat clearer. There, the Court reviewed allocations of value among
creditors (the owners were already excluded through a lack of reorganiza-
tion value) and was forced to come to grips with state law entitlements. It
determined that absolute priority is satisfied if "each security holder in the
order of his priority receives from that which is available for the satisfaction
of his claim the equitable equivalent of the rights surrendered."'' The
Court focused on the exchange of old debt for new securities. It further
implied that creditors must receive rights reasonably equivalent in value to
the rights they surrender. 112 Thus, a reorganization lawyer's task lies in
adroit drafting of the terms of the securities issued by the debtor.
The Court's decision also imposed a limitation on a creditor's right to
receive property equal in value to the debt surrendered. Creditors partici-
pate to the lesser of their aggregate claims or the debtor's reorganization
value. Viewed another way, solvent debtors satisfy the absolute priority rule
when they distribute securities that are reasonably equivalent to the credi-
tors' pre-petition claims. Insolvent debtors, by contrast, need only distribute
securities that have an aggregate value equal to the debtor's reorganization
value. In a non-trivial sense, this value is all the value the debtor has.1 3
109. 228 U.S. at 508. The Court affirmed this principle in Case, 308 U.S. at 117; see also
Kansas City Terminal, 271 U.S. at 454-55.
110. 318 U.S. 523 (1943).
111. Id. at 565 (emphasis added).
112. Cf. Kansas City Terminal, 271 U.S. at 455 ("Unsecured creditors of insolvent corpora-
tions are entitled to the benefit of the values which remain after lienholders are satisfied, whether this
is present or prospective, for dividends or only for purposes of control.") (emphasis added).
113. Against this background, the Court recently committed at least four errors in its attempt
to construe the absolute priority rule in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
First, the Court misstated the rule's origins, noting that "[t]he rule had its genesis in judicial con-
struction of the undefined requirement of the early bankruptcy statute that reorganization plans be
'fair and equitable.'" Id. at 202. As shown above, the "genesis" was in equity receiverships and
fraudulent transfer law. In fact, the rule's origins predate the 1899 Act, to which the Court referred.
The second error occurred in the statement of the absolute priority rule itself. The Court said
that "the absolute priority rule 'provides that a dissenting class of unsecured creditors must be pro-
vided for in full before any junior class can receive or retain any property [under a reorganization]
plan.'" Id. (alteration in the original). As shown in the text, this statement may apply to solvent
debtors, but it is too restrictive for insolvent ones. Creditors' participation rights end when they
receive their aliquot share of reorganization value. As the Court interpreted the rule, absolute prior-
ity would eliminate the ability to solicit owners or junior creditors for assessments or additional
contributions.
Third, the Court mistakenly asserted that the rule "gained express statutory force, and was
incorporated into Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code adopted in 1978. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1982 ed., Supp IV)." Id. The problem here lies in the restricted citation: the
cited subsection applies only to unsecured creditors, yet a different subsection refers to secured credi-
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Although Congress deleted the "fair and equitable" requirement from
Chapter XI in 1952,114 no real challenge to Case was made until Congress
commissioned a review of the bankruptcy laws in the early 1970s. 115 The
contours of the absolute priority rule were then due for re-examination.
D. The Second Codification: Absolute Priority and the Code
By 1973, the Act was due for overhaul.1 1 6 Part of the revision effort
centered on tempering the effects of the absolute priority rule.1 17 Strong
disagreement among interested groups from business, 11 8 academic,11 9 and
tors and equity interests. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (1988); id. § 1129(b)(2)(C). The Court,
furthermore, fails to provide for any of the uncodified components of the rule. See Klee, Cram Down
II, supra note 11.
Finally, the Court stated that "it is clear that Congress had no intention to expand [the new
value] exception" beyond that in place prior to codification. 485 U.S. at 205. This observation
overlooks the fact that Congress explicitly and consciously relaxed the conditions under which the
absolute priority rule could be waived. Prior to the Code's adoption, a single creditor had the right
to invoke the absolute priority rule. After the Code's adoption, however, class vote could override a
single creditor's interests, thereby waiving the application of the rule. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126(c),
1129(a)(8), 1129(b)(1) (1988). This change was far more significant to creditors' rights than any
which could be wrought by tinkering with purported exceptions. See text accompanying note 283
infra.
114. Pub. L. No. 82-456, § 35, 66 Stat. 420, 433 (1953); see note 152 infra.
115. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970).
116. The report of the Commission established in 1970 suggested extensive changes. BANK-
RUPTCY COMMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANK-
RUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter
COMMISSION REPORT]. Bills based upon the Commission's suggestions were introduced in 1973. S.
2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 10792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Although Congress held
preliminary hearings on these bills, it took no further action. With some revisions, the Commission's
bill was reintroduced during the next session. S. 235, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1975); H.R. 31, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1975).
117. The Commission found that "the rigidity of the [absolute priority] rule has frequently
resulted in the destruction rather than the protection of interests of public investors.... [These
investors] are frequently eliminated from participation in a reorganization by reason of the strict
application of a statute designed primarily for their protection." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
116, pt. 1, at 256.
According to the Commission's proposal, equity owners could participate "if their future con-
tributions, e.g., continued management, [were] essential to the business." Id, pt. 2, § 7-303(4), at
258. This section was designed to "adopt[ ] the District Court's opinion which was reversed in
Case." Id, pt. 2, § 7-303(4), Commission's note at 254. The Commission also suggested allowing
delayed participation for equity holders when future increased performance so justified. Id., pt. 2,
§ 7-303(3), at 241. Finally, it sought to streamline the type and amount of valuation evidence neces-
sary to establish compliance with the absolute priority rule. Id., pt. 2, § 7-310(2)(B), at 252.
118. The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings on . 235 and S. 236, Before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 459 (1975)
[hereinafter 5. 235 and S. 236 Hearings] (statement of Robert J. Grimmig, on behalf of the American
Bankers Association); id. at 654-55 (statement of John J. Creedon, on behalf of American Life Insur-
ance Association).
119. Id. at 1043-44 (subsequent statement of Vernon Countryman, December 19, 1975) (stat-
ing that the Commission proposal discusses the absolute priority concept with "weasel words" on
valuation, and urging "the subcommittee to return to the original 'fair and equitable' test without the
leeway-providing verbiage"); Victor Brudney, The Bankruptcy Commission's Proposed "Modifica-
tions"of the Absolute Priority Rule, 48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 305 (1974); Note, The Proposed Bankruptcy
Act: Changes in the Absolute Priority Rule for Corporate Reorganizations, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1786
(1974).
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governmental 120 quarters, over the need for, and the proper scope of, any
reform created an impasse.
This deadlock broke in early 1976 through compromise. 12 1 The compro-
mise called for two changes to the absolute priority rule. First, it proposed
that only classes of creditors could invoke the rule. In this respect the com-
promise sought to overrule the procedural protections afforded by Case:
under the compromise, an individual creditor who had been outvoted could
not challenge a plan on absolute priority grounds.1 22 Second, under the
compromise, individual creditors, in lieu of the absolute priority rule, would
receive the "best interest of creditors" test. As a consequence, each creditor
would receive an amount at least equal to the liquidation value of its claim.
From the debtor's perspective, any allocation of the value in excess of liqui-
dation value should be distributed by majority vote. An individual creditor
could no longer bargain for every last dollar of going concern value. Once
the creditor received its liquidation value, the Code allocated the surplus of
going concern value over liquidation value by democratic vote within and
among classes of creditors.1 23 With the compromise in hand, the legislative
process restarted.
The first bill introduced after the compromise, H.R. 6,124 contained a
120. S. 235 and S. 236 Hearings, supra note 118, at 709-10, 716 (statement of Philip A.
Loomis, Jr., Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission) ("We oppose the... modifica-
tions of the absolute priority rule.").
121. The terms of this compromise were set forth in a letter to Congress from the respective
heads of the National Bankruptcy Conference and the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges.
Letter from John Copenhaver, President, National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, & Charles A.
Horsky, Chairman, National Bankruptcy Conference, to Congress (June 12, 1976), reprinted in
Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H. 32 Before the Subcomr. on Civil and Con-
stitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1938 (1976) [hereinafter
Hearings on HR. 31 and H.R. 32].
122. According to the compromise:
[A] junior class may receive reorganization values even if a superior class receives less than
its full priority interest (valued on a going concern basis) so long as the superior class
consents and receives its liquidation value, ie., best interest test. Under these circum-
stances the absolute priority rule does not apply.
Id. at 1941. This letter, together with the Commission's work, formed the basis for the Code's sec-
tions involving the absolute priority rule. SUBCOMMITEE [SIC] ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, TABLE OF DERIVATION OF H.R. 8200, 95th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 23 (Comm. Print 1977).
123. J. Ronald Trost, Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: For The Benefit of Creditors or
Shareholders?, 21 UCLA L. REV. 540, 550-51 (1973). These changes obviated the need to debate
the Commission's proposed relaxation of the rule: "Because of the changes in the confirmation
rules, the provisions of the pending bills which 'relax' the absolute priority rule standards, Le., § 7-
303(3) and (4) ... are no longer necessary." Letter from John Copenhaver, President, National
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, & Charles A. Horsky, Chairman, National Bankruptcy Confer-
ence, to Congress, supra note 121, at 1941.
124. As initially introduced on January 4, 1977, § 1129(b) of H.R. 6 read as follows:
(b) If all of the requirements of subsection (a) of this section other than paragraph (8) are
met with respect to a plan, the court, on request of the proponent of such plan, shall
confirm such plan notwithstanding such paragraph if such plan is fair and equitable with
respect to all classes except any class that has accepted the plan and that is comprised of
claims or interests on account of which the holders of such claims or interests will receive
or retain under the plan not more than would be so received or retained under a plan that
is fair and equitable with respect to all classes.
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simple statement of the compromise position: a court would confirm a plan
"if such plan [were] fair and equitable with respect to all classes except any
class that has accepted the plan." 25 This bill was amended two and one-
half months later to eliminate the simple injunction that the plan be "fair
and equitable." In its stead, the amended bill attempted to define fair and
equitable treatment, but without using the words "fair and equitable."'
26
Successive bills added to the statement of the rule.1 27 The House Report
reflected these changes, but categorized them as a "partial codification" of
the absolute priority rule.128
After some procedural wrangling with the Senate, the House's version of
the bankruptcy bill prevailed. 129 But it contained a drastically different
treatment of nonconsensual reorganizations which implicated the absolute
priority rule. Whereas the original House bill contained only one subsection
on nonconsensual confirmation that did not use the words "fair and equita-
ble,"130 the bill that emerged for final consideration included two subsec-
tions on the topic, and explicitly incorporated the phrase "fair and
equitable." 13 1 The first subsection harkened back to H.R. 6 by providing
that a court could cramdown a non-consensual plan over the dissent of any
class only if the plan were, among other things, "fair and equitable."' 32
Although the bill did not attempt to define this concept explicitly, Con-
gress's prior efforts to define it were not lost. The second subsection on
cramdown retained the various treatments developed in earlier bills as exam-
ples of fair and equitable treatment.133 As the floor remarks made clear, the
list of illustrations was not exhaustive; courts were not to exclude other com-
ponents and interpretations.134
H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1129(b) (Jan. 4, 1977).
125. Id
126. H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1129(b) (Mar. 21, 1977). This bill was the first to create
different categories of fair and equitable treatment for different types of claims.
127. See H.R. 7330, 95th Cong., 1st. Sess. § 1129(b) (May 23, 1977); H.R. 8200, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 1129(b) (July 11, 1977); and H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1129(b) (Sept. 8, 1977).
128. H.R. Rep. No. 595, supra note 105, at 414. The report also confirmed the rule's focus on
returning only the reorganization value to creditors. It stated that "creditors are entitled to be paid
according to the going concern value of the business." Id. at 223.
129. The Senate attempted to substitute a bill sponsored by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission in place of the House bill. See S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). This bill proposed
preserving a two-track reorganization system, and required a mandatory trustee for debtors whose
equity interests were publicly held. Id. § 1130. Under this substitute bill, private companies would
be exempt from the fair and equitable rule. Id.
130. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1129(b) (Sept. 8, 1977).
131. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1129(b), reprinted in 124 CONG. REc. 32,350 (1978).
Due to these changes, the statements on absolute priority contained in H.R. REP. No. 595, supra
note 105, are not as authoritative as they might otherwise be. Congress recognized this, and in lieu
of a Conference Report, read virtually identical statements into both the House and Senate records
on the bill. 124 CONG. REc. at 32,391 (statement of Rep. Rousselot). As noted at the time, Con-
gress believed that this procedure imbued such remarks with "the effect of being a conference re-
port." Id.
132. Id. at 32,376 (statement of Rep. Rousselot).
133. Technically, the bill stated that the fair and equitable treatment "included" the examples.
Id.
134. Id. at 32,407 (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at 34,006 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeCon-
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The scope of these unmentioned yet nonexcluded items was broad.
Among the concepts that did not receive explicit statutory expansion, for
example, was the fundamental idea that no participant should receive more
than its nonbankruptcy entitlement. That other uncodified concepts re-
mained underscores the open texture of the statute. 135
III. THE EPHEMERAL EXCEPTION: NECESSARY NEw VALUE
A. The Second Strand: New Value and Owner Participation
As already indicated, Congress's treatment of absolute priority left
courts with many loose ends to untangle.136 Some of these lay in the so-
called uncodified aspects of the fair and equitable requirement. 137 But Con-
gress left the courts another, more fundamental uncertainty to resolve: the
new value "exception" to the absolute priority rule. A distinct line of cases
tracing back to Case focuses specifically upon the role of the owner in reor-
ganization, and purportedly states the conditions on which owners can pre-
serve their ownership in the reorganized debtor. Many believe that these
cases create an exception to the absolute priority rule. 138 These cases, how-
ever, do not establish any exception; they simply restate the absolute priority
rule itself.
Recall first that Case could have been decided solely on absolute priority
grounds. The value of the debtor's property did not permit continued partic-
ipation by its shareholders.1 39 Nevertheless, the debtor attempted to show
that the absolute priority rule permitted continued shareholder participa-
tion. It argued that its shareholders were contributing sufficient value to
retain their interests through their "continuity of management" and their
"financial standing and influence in the community." 14°
This claim came at a critical time in reorganization history. Section 77B
cini) (noting that "many of the factors interpreting 'fair and equitable'.. . , which were explicated in
the description of section 1129(b) in the House report, were omitted from the House amendment
.... [T]he deletion is intended to be one of style and not one of substance.").
135. See Klee, Cram Down II, supra note 11, at 234-37 (suggesting that it is unclear whether
senior creditors must receive post-petition interest before junior creditors receive anything); id. at
237-38 (suggesting that it is unclear whether senior creditors may be paid in securities inferior in
priority or quality to those issued to junior creditors).
136. For example, the proper treatment of smailer debtors such as proprietors and one-person
corporations remained unanswered. Debtors who might otherwise have filed for Chapter XI under
the Act now had to be concerned with the absolute priority rule. These debtors presented new
problems in applying Chapter XI principles to individuals. See H. Gray Burks IV, Application of the
Absolute Priority Rule to Exemptible and Abandonable Property-Is Cramdown Eliminated in Indi-
vidual Chapter 11's?, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVIS. 1, 1 (Jan. 1991); Peeples, supra note 21. Under
the strict rules of Chapter I 1 voting, these debtors still had to meet the voting requirements of
§ 1 129(a)(8) if they were to allocate value to themselves. Thus, a hunt for an exception began. See
e.g., In re Yasparro, 100 B.R. 91, 99 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); In re Witt, 60 B.R. 556 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1986); In re East, 57 B.R. 14 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985).
137. See Klee, Cram Down II, supra note 11.
138. See note 21 supra.
139. See note 97 supra.
140. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 U.S. 106, 122 (1939). In addition, the debtor at-
tempted to place a value on the relinquishment of its right to postpone foreclosure for almost ten
years. Id. at 127. The Court rejected this proffer, stating: "The right to remain in unmolested
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had ended its short life of four years, and Congress had already replaced it
with Chapters X and XI of the Act. 141 These acts were not entirely new
legislation; they contained much of the same language as Section 77B, in-
cluding the fair and equitable requirement. 142 Given the new statute and the
perceived evils of Section 77B, however, it is not surprising that the Solicitor
General appeared amicus curiae on behalf of Case. He argued strongly that
the proffered contributions were inadequate under the fair and equitable rule
as applicable in equity reorganizations, Section 77B, and Chapter X. He
also addressed the general standard for owner participation in reorganiza-
tions under Boyd's "fixed principle," stating that it was limited to those situ-
ations in which "the contribution is either in money or in money's worth
[and is] reasonably equivalent to the participation afforded." 143
Justice Douglas adopted and adapted the Solicitor General's view and
language. In writing Case, he stated that "[t]he stockholder's participation
must be based on a contribution in money or money's worth, reasonably
equivalent in view of all the circumstances to the participation of the
stockholder."144
Justice Douglas nonetheless applied only half of this test. He looked first
at the proposed contributions of continuity and reputation, which were
surely different from the cash assessments common in equity reorganiza-
tions. He categorized the claimed contributions as "intangible" and
"ephemeral,"1 45 and further stated that allowing such "vague hopes or pos-
sibilities" to count as contributions would be to permit "easy evasions of the
principle of full or absolute priority." 14 6 Such intangibles had no place on
the debtor's balance sheet and thus could not be of any conceivable benefit to
dominion and control over the property was necessarily waived or abandoned on invoking the juris-
diction of the federal courts in these proceedings." Id
141. Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 840 (1938). The succession was something of
a victory for Justice Douglas. While a member of the Yale Law School faculty, he had written
articles condemning certain receivership reorganization practices. Douglas & Frank, supra note 48;
William 0. Douglas, Protective Committees in Railroad Reorganizations, 47 HARV. L. REv. 565
(1934). Later, as a member of the Securities and Exchange Commission, he chaired and bore pri-
mary responsibility for a Commission study on the effectiveness and fairness of Section 77B. SEC
REPORT, supra note 19. Chapter X contained most of the Commission's suggested reforms.
142. Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 221(2), 52 Stat. 840; 11 U.S.C. § 621(2) (repealed 1979).
143. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 40-41, Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939) (Nos. 39-23 & 39-24) [hereinafter Brief].
144. 308 U.S. at 122. As noted in Ayer, supra note 17, at 975 n.57, the Solicitor General's brief
relied heavily upon Carl B. Spaeth & Gordon M. Winks, The Boyd Case and Section 77, 32 ILL. L.
Rv. 769 (1938). Justice Douglas also incorporated the necessity requirement suggested in the So-
licitor General's brief. The Solicitor General stated that as a condition to continued shareholder
participation, the Court had to find that the owners' contribution was essential to the success of the
reorganization, and that the "new funds [could not] be obtained unless stockholders are permitted to
contribute and retain an interest." Brief, supra note 143, at 42. Following this lead, Justice Douglas
wrote: "Especially in the latter case [Kansas City Terminal] did this Court stress the necessity, at
times, of seeking new money 'essential to the success of the undertaking' from the old stockholders.
Where that necessity exists and the old stockholders make a fresh contribution and receive in return
a participation reasonably equivalent to their contribution, no objection can be made." Case, 308
U.S. at 121 (footnote omitted).
145. Case, 308 U.S. at 122-23.
146. Id.
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the creditors of the reorganized debtor.1 47
Having rejected the substance of the proffered consideration, Justice
Douglas never reached the second half of the test-the relation between the
quantity of the proposed contribution and the level of continued participa-
tion. He thus never directly addressed the scope and meaning of "reasonable
equivalen[ce]." Had Section 77B remained in the Act, shareholders may
have had the incentive to test the limits of "reasonable equivalen[ce]."
But, as already noted, Section 77B was shortlived. Although Chapter X
retained the fair and equitable requirement, 148 it mandated the appointment
of a disinterested trustee.1 49 This factor at least partially explains the prefer-
ence, from 1938 to the Code's adoption in 1978, for filing under Chapter XI
rather than under Chapter X. Although Chapter XI purported to affect
only unsecured debt, 150 owners perceived that it had at least two key advan-
tages over Chapter X. First, it did not require a trustee to be appointed and
thus left insiders in control.151 Second, it was free from the absolute priority
rule. 15
2
As a result of this filing preference, the number of likely candidates for
application of new value principles declined. Because the absolute priority
rule did not apply in Chapter XI proceedings, the issue never arose in those
cases. In the Chapter X arena, no shareholder was ever able to convince a
court that she contributed sufficient value to be able to retain an interest.
Indeed, until the Code's adoption in 1978, no reported case seems to have
adopted Justice Douglas' dicta as its holding.15 3 Rather, the reported cases
147. Id.
148. Act § 221(2); 11 U.S.C. § 621(2) (repealed 1979). The Supreme Court stated that the new
statute left "unaltered" its construction of fair and equitable. Case, 308 U.S. at 119 n.14. It later
held that the absolute priority rule had been incorporated wholesale into Chapter X. Marine Harbor
Properties, Inc. v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78, 85 (1942).
149. Act § 156; 11 U.S.C. § 556 (repealed 1979). This was one of the points supported by the
Securities and Exchange Commission in its testimony before Congress. See Revision of the Bank-
ruptcy Act: Hearings on H.R. 6439 and H.R. 8046 Before the Subcomm. on Bankruptcy and Reorgan-
ization of the House CommL on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 162-200 (1937) (testimony of
William 0. Douglas), reprinted in H. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong. Ist Sess. 37-38. No trustee was
necessary under Chapter X if the debtor had less than $250,000 of non-contingent debt. Act § 156,
11 U.S.C. § 556 (repealed 1979).
150. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 116, pt. 1, at 240.
151. Id., pt. 1, at 244.
152. Congress deleted the "fair and equitable" requirement from Chapter XI in 1952. Pub. L.
No. 82-456, § 35, 66 Stat. 420, 433 (1952). As the accompanying House Report stated, "the fair and
equitable rule, as interpreted in [Boyd and Case] cannot be realistically applied in a Chapter XI
[action].... Were it so applied .... no corporate debtor where the stock ownership is subrstantially
identical with management could effectuate an arrangement except by payment of the claims of all
creditors in full." H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1952); see also S. REP. No. 1395,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1952). Currently, Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 debt adjustment plans do
not need to be "fair and equitable" with respect to dissenting creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1),
1325(b)(1) (1988).
153. Two cases deserve special attention for what they do not hold. Horowitz v. Kaplan (In re
Waltham Watch), 193 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 946 (1952) is often mentioned
as support for allowing interests in a reorganized debtor to be awarded to owners based on the
provision of labor. In Waltham Watch, however, after the Chapter X case was filed, and although he
"received no compensation, and had no stock interest, [Sachs, the manager of the debtor company]
devoted practically all of his time in an effort to effect a reorganization and a reopening of the plant."
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during that period focused on whether the reorganization value of the com-
pany was sufficient to permit junior interests to participate without further
contribution.
But the precedent did not die. It languished, seemingly moribund, until
the Code's adoption in 1978. Since then, there has been an explosion of
cases which discuss the new value "exception" to the absolute priority
rule.154 Some courts have stated that new value principles apply only when
It. at 68. In addition, Sachs lent substantial sums to the debtor in order to process inventory and
pay down the one creditor blocking reorganization. Id. at 69.
The trustee's plan allowed Sachs to buy stock and granted stock options to him. Due to the
combined efforts of the manager and the trustee, the value of the stock and the option increased
between the time the bargain was struck and the time of the Chapter X confirmation hearing.
Sachs's price was $.25 per share, which was the quoted price as of the filing; by the time of the
confirmation hearing, the quoted price reached $2 per share. Id. at 71. The option's strike price was
approximately pegged at 95% of market value. Id. at 70.
The court approved the plan over the objection of shareholders, who had the opportunity to
subscribe for additional shares. It distinguished Case on what seemed to be a proper basis: Sachs
had no equity interest at all which the plan protected. Id. at 74. All that Sachs protected, at best,
was his future employment. Id. at 75. Moreover, the court stressed, he did not receive the benefit of
below market prices for a promise of future labor, the reward was for risks taken during the pen-
dency of the proceeding. Id. at 74-75. In short, at least a portion of the compensation to Sachs
satisfied an administrative claim for value given, which would have been senior to general creditors'
claims in any event.
A similar case, In re Polycast Corp., 289 F. Supp. 707 (D. Conn. 1968), involved a former
president of an acrylic sheet and photographic filters manufacturer who lent equipment to the Chap-
ter X trustee. He and his investor group also agreed, pursuant to the Chapter X trustee's plan, to
contribute property worth over $312,000 in exchange for 81% of the equity interests in the reorga-
nized debtor. The debtor had a reorganization value of $784,000. Id at 710. The court found that
the amount of interest received was "commensurate with and does not exceed the contributions
which [the contributors] have made and will make." Id. at 712. The court, however, need not have
reached this conclusion as it chose not to implicate the absolute priority rule for the same reason that
Waltham Watch did not. Those who funded the plan of reorganization lacked any equity interest in
the corporation. Id. at 710-11. Furthermore, finding possible candidates to acquire the debtor, and
then sponsoring a plan which incorporated the best proposal, were among the precise functions of a
Chapter X trustee.
154. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988), rev ? 794 F.2d 388 (8th
Cir. 1986); In re Stegall, 865 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1989), aff'g 85 B.R. 510 (C.D. Ill. 1987); In re
Blankemeyer, 861 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1988); Carson Nugget, Inc. v. Green (In re Green), 98 B.R.
981, 982 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989); In re Hendrix, No. 90-635-BKC-3P1, 1991 WL 185112 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 19, 1991); In re Ashton, 107 B.R. 670 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1989); In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989); In re Club Assocs., 107 B.R. 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989); In re Water-
ways Barge Partnership, 104 B.R. 776 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1989); In re Sherwood Square Assocs.,
107 B.R. 872 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989); In re Johnson, 101 B.R. 307 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); In re
Perdido Motel Group, Inc., 101 B.R. 289 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989); Penbank v. Winters (In re
Winters), 99 B.R. 658 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989); In re Kramer, 96 B.R 972 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989); In
re Kendavis Indus. Int'l, 91 B.R. 742 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988); In re UVAS Farming Corp., 91 B.R.
579 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1988); In re Maropa Marine Sales Serv. & Storage, Inc., 90 B.R. 544 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1988); Travelers Ins. v. Olson (In re Olson), 80 B.R. 935 (Bankr. C.D. IlI. 1987); In re AG
Consultants Grain Div., Inc., 77 B.R. 665 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987); In re Bohman, 77 B.R. 639
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987); In re Eisenbarth, 77 B.R. 228 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987); In re Roberts Rocky
Mountain Equip. Co., 76 B.R. 784 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987); In re Baugh, 73 B.R. 414 (Bankr. E.D.
Ark. 1987); In re Star City Rebuilders, Inc., 62 B.R. 983 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986); In re Witt, 60
B.R. 556 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986); In re Pecht, 57 B.R. 137 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986); In re East, 57
B.R. 14 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985); In re Pecht, 53 B.R. 768 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985); In re Jartran,
Inc., 44 B.R. 331 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984); In re Modem Glass Specialists, Inc., 42 B.R. 139 (Bankr.
E.D. Wis. 1984); In re Knutson, 40 B.R. 142 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984); In re Fursman Ranch, 38
B.R. 907 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984); In re Barr, 38 B.R. 323 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984); In re Toy &
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creditors are paid in full. 155 Others assert that any contribution will suffice if
the debtor is insolvent. 156 Still others claim that some link between the con-
tribution and the debt discharged by the plan must exist to trigger the new
value rule.' 57 In short, interpretive chaos reigns.
The Supreme Court has addressed these critical issues but not in a very
helpful manner. In Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers,15 8 a farmer an-
swered a creditor's relief from stay motion by asserting that he could con-
firm a new value plan with the promise of future labor. Although he
managed to convince the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that his plan was
permissible, the Supreme Court disagreed.
Facing the issue directly, the Court stated that a debtor's "promise of
future labor warrants no exception to [the] operation [of the absolute prior-
ity rule]."' 159 The Court thus rejected the lower court's conclusion that the
debtors' "future contributions of 'labor, experience and expertise' in running
the farm-because they have 'value' and are 'measurable'-are 'money or
money's worth' within the meaning of Los Angeles Lumber."''0
Had the Court stopped at that conclusion, Ahlers would be an unexcep-
tional example of the Court correcting errors made by a lower court. But
the Court did not stop there; it continued on, questioning whether the new
value exception survived the codification of the Code in 1978.
The Solicitor General's amicus curiae brief prompted this discussion.
The Solicitor General argued that because Section 1129(b) did not explicitly
retain any exception to the fair and equitable rule, Congress had "dropped
the infusion-of-new capital exception to the absolute priority rule."' 16 The
Supreme Court responded:
Sports Warehouse, Inc., 37 B.R. 141 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Huckabee Auto Co., 33 B.R. 132
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1981); In re Genesee Cement, Inc., 31 B.R. 442 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983); In re
Tomlin, 22 B.R. 876 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1982); see also notes 163-175 infra.
The explosion of cases discussing absolute priority is not hard to explain. Chapter 11 allows
insiders to remain in control and gives them advantages not available under the Act to retain that
control. See text accompanying notes 280-284 infra.
155. In re Drimmel, 108 B.R. 284, 289 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989); In re 47th & Belleview Part-
ners, 95 B.R. 117, 120 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988); In re Rudy Debruycker Ranch, Inc., 84 B.R. 187,
190 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1988). If followed to its logical conclusion, this position clearly eliminates any
"exception."
156. See, eg., In re Jartran, Inc., 44 B.R. at 368 (holding that an owner may retain an interest
only if the full going concern value has first been allocated to creditors).
157. See, eg., In re Kendavis Indus. Int'l, Inc., 91 B.R. at 749 (deeming proffered contribution
of $5,000,000 insubstantial in light of $500,000,000 outstanding debt); In re Olson, 80 B.R. at 937
(finding contribution which was only 1.56% of the unsecured debt insubstantial).
158. 485 U.S. 197 (1988). See note 113 supra for a criticism of the Court's treatment of the
absolute priority rule.
159. Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 206.
160. Id. at 203. Although beyond the scope of this article, it is surprising that the court did
not look to 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2), which defines new value for purposes of preference law. It states
that" 'new value' means money or money's worth in goods, services, or new credit." Id (emphasis
added). This is consistent with those cases finding, in the absolute priority context, that new value
exists for services already rendered, as opposed to services to be rendered. See, eg., Horowitz v.
Kaplan (In re Waltham Watch), 193 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 946 (1952).
161. Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 22, Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers,
485 U.S. 197 (1988) (No. 86-958).
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We need not reach this question to resolve the instant dispute. ... [W]e
think it clear that even if the Los Angeles Lumber exception to the absolute
priority rule has survived enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, this exception
does not encompass respondents' promise to contribute their "labor, experi-
ence, and expertise" to the reorganized enterprise.
Thus, our decision today should not be taken as any comment on the
continuing vitality of the Los Angeles Lumber exception-a question which
has divided the lower courts since passage of the Code in 1978. Rather, we
simply conclude that even if an "infusion-of-'money-or-money's-worth"'
exception to the absolute priority rule has survived the enactment of
§ 1129(b), respondents' proposed contribution to the reorganization plan is
inadequate to gain the benefit of this exception.
162
This dictum caused a furor among lower courts. One court has inter-
preted this statement as a divine hint, suggesting that "there are no excep-
tions to the absolute priority rule as codified by the 1978 Code. Thus, the
only way the rule is satisfied is by payment in full of the senior class."
163
Other courts have agreed, 164 while some have declined to find that Congress
discarded new value principles. 165 Another group has wallowed in uncon-
vincing attempts to apply and refine the absolute priority rule. 1
66
162. Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 203 n.3 (citation omitted).
163. In re Rudy Debruycker Ranch, Inc., 84 B.R. 187, 190 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1988).
164. See, eg., In re Outlook/Century Ltd., 127 B.R. 650, 656 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991); In re
Embassy Ent. of St. Cloud, 125 B.R. 553, 554 (D. Minn. 1991); In re Lumber Exch. Ltd. Partner-
ship, 125 B.R. 1000, 1008-09 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991); In re Drimmel, 108 B.R. 284, 288-89 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1989); In re 47th & Belleview Partners, 95 B.R. 117, 120 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988).
165. See, eg., Anderson v. Farm Credit Bank (In re Anderson), 913 F.2d 530, 532 (8th Cir.
1990); Piedmont Assocs. v. CIGNA Property & Casualty Ins. Co., CIV.A.: 91-CV1840JOF, 1991
WL 193700 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 3, 1991); In re Mortgage Inv. Co., 111 B.R. 604, 618 & n.23 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Pullman Constr. Indus. Inc., 107 B.R. 909, 943-48 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989);
In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 B.R. 560, 572-75 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989), aff'd, 127 B.R.
138 (W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Yasparro, 100 B.R. 91, 96-97 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989).
166. See, eg., In re 222 Liberty Assocs., 108 B.R. 971, 983 n.12 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (inter-
preting Case to be a determination of the substantiality of the proffered contribution); In re Henke,
90 B.R. 451 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1988) (allowing an individual to contribute nonexempt property,
income from a patent held in the name of the owner, for purposes of new value exception).
A plethora of faithless renditions of the original test partially explains this confusion. A prime
example appears in Official Creditors' Comm. ex reL Class 8 Unsecured Creditors v. Potter Material
Serv., Inc. (In re Potter Material Serv., Inc.), 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986). In that case, a share-
holder agreed to fund plan payments to unsecured creditors, and discharge their claims for a cash
payment equal to 3% of their claims. He also agreed to guarantee bank debt incurred pursuant to
the plan and to pay certain administrative claims. Id at 100.
The court implicitly found that the cash offer satisfied the requirement of "money or money's
worth" by attempting to assess the sufficiency of this contribution with Case standards. According
to the court, any contribution "must (1) represent a substantial contribution and (2) equal or exceed
the value of the retained interest in the corporation." Id. at 100. Although the second part of the
test corresponds to Case's dictum that the contribution be "reasonably equivalent in view of all the
circumstances to the participation of the stockholder," Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308
U.S. 106, 121 (1939), the first part of the test--substantiality--does not appear in Case.
The Potter court cited three cases in support of its "substantiality" requirement: Case, In re
Marston Ent., Inc., 13 B.R. 514 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981), and In re Landau Boat Co., 13 B.R. 788
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981). None of these cases support its use. Case does not use the word "substan-
tial" in any context relevant here. Marston, in turn, used the term when discussing Case's require-
ment of "money or money's worth"; it equated "substantial" with "tangible." In re Marston, 13
B.R. at 518. It did not, however, use "substantial" to describe the requirement of reasonable
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B. The Ephemeral Exception
1. The equivalence of new value and absolute priority.
Confusion over the absolute priority rule is deplorable, especially when
the rule is fundamental to reorganization. The basic problem is that the use
of the term "exception" to describe new value principles is a catachresis.
The conditions required to satisfy the new value "exception" also satisfy the
absolute priority rule.
Recall the requirements for the new value "exception" as set forth in
Case: "[W]here the debtor is insolvent, the stoeldiolder's participation must
be based on a contribution in money or money's worth, reasonably
equivalent in view of all the circumstances to the participation of the stock-
holder." 167 Many new value cases have turned on the issue of whether the
debtor's owners have offered to contribute "money or money's worth." 168
In Ahlers, for example, the Court simply reaffirmed that a promise of future
labor is not sufficiently tangible (and therefore leviable) to meet this stan-
dard.1 69 Even after Ahlers, however, lower courts continue to assess the
quality of proffered contributions: guaranties of postconfirmation debt, 170
payment of certain expenses of the debtor,17 1 release of liens, 172 outright
forgiveness or cancellation of debt,173 and a host of other possible contribu-
tions174 have all been reviewed for their acceptability.
The issues in these cases are rather straightforward. For whatever rea-
son, a class of creditors declines to accept the owners' plan, and the owners
then seek to confirm over the creditors' objection. The court's inquiry under
Case is disarmingly simple. First, the court measures the owners' proffered
equivalency. Thus, Marston transplanted a descriptive term for the quality of a contribution to the
quantity analysis, and other courts blindly followed this error. Landau Boat simply adopted Mar-
ston's formulation. In re Landau, 13 B.R. at 792-93.
167. 308 U.S. at 122.
168. See, e.g., In re Drimmel, 108 B.R. 284; In re Lettick Typografic, Inc., 103 B.R. 32 (Bankr.
D. Conn.); In re Yasparro, 100 B.R. at 91; In re Rudy Debruycker Ranch, Inc., 84 B.R. 187; In re
Sawmill Hydraulics, Inc., 72 B.R. 454 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987).
169. 485 U.S. at 197.
170. E.g., Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2., Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir.
1990); In re Potter Material Serv., Inc., 781 F.2d 99; In re Pullman, 107 B.R. 909; In re 47th &
Belleview Partners, 95 B.R. 117 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (net cash deficiency guaranty by general
partner); In re Maropa Marine Sales Serv. & Storage, Inc., 90 B.R. 544 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988); In re
Sawmill Hydraulics, 72 B.R. 454.
171. See, eg., In re Drimmel, 108 B.R. 284; In re Future Energy Corp., 83 B.R. 470 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1988) (payment of debtor's pre-confirmation attorneys' fees).
172. E.g., In re Snyder, 105 B.R. 898, 900-01 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989); In re Future Energy
Corp., 83 B.R. 470.
173. E.g., In re C.P.M. Constr., 124 B.R. 335 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1991) (claim for difference
between market wages and actual wages); In re Lettick Typografic, Inc., 103 B.R. 32; In re Future
Energy Corp., 83 B.R. 470.
174. E.g., In re Hendrix, No. 90-635-BKC-3P1, 1991 WL 185112 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 1991)
(promise of debtor's wife to provide $800 a month to fund plan); In re Snyder, 105 B.R. at 899 (gift
from third party); In re Henke, 90 B.R. 451, 456 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1988) (income from patent); In re
Rudy Debruycker Ranch, Inc., 84 B.R. at 189 (inheritance); Brown v. Brown's Indus. Uniforms,
Inc. (In re Brown's Indus. Uniforms, Inc.), 58 B.R. 139, 140-41 (Bankr. N.D.'Ill. 1985) (pledge of
owner's personal assets to secure payment of reorganization debt).
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contribution against a quality scale. If the contribution possesses the requi-
site quality, that is, if it is equivalent to money or money's worth, then Case
requires a second and more interesting inquiry. Will the "old stockholders
... receive in return a participation reasonably equivalent to their contribu-
tion"?175 This test appears to require two simple valuations: that of the
proffered contribution and that of the interest received. The application of
the test then consists of comparing the two to see if they are reasonably
equivalent. This comparison, however, also requires the valuation of at least
one more item: the debtor itself. This additional valuation is necessary due
to the link between the value of the debtor and the value of all ownership
interests in the debtor; a 100% equity interest in a debtor is worth no more
and no less than the debtor itself. This introduction of the debtor's value,
however, leads to the realization that application of Case's dicta yields the
same result in all cases as does application of the absolute priority rule to the
same facts. For all practical purposes, the two are equivalent. 176
This can be seen from a simple example. Case's dicta requires that an
owner's contribution be reasonably equivalent to the interest retained. In
the most common example, this means that if an owner seeks to retain a
100% interest in the debtor, then she must contribute property reasonably
equivalent to the debtor's postconfirmation value.
But postconfirmation value is not the price that a third party would pay
for a debt-free company. Although this is the starting point,177 such value
must reflect reductions from that debt-free value equal to the amount of obli-
gations incurred or continued in the reorganization plan. 178 For example, if
a company which is otherwise worth $200 incurs $150 of debt in its plan of
reorganization, then its postconfirmation value will reduce to $50.
Case would seem to require the owner in this example to pay $50 for the
debtor's equity. But if creditors receive nothing more than the $150 in reor-
ganization debt, the reasonable equivalence requirement is not met. The
contribution of $50 raises the post-confirmation value to $100.179 If no fur-
ther value is given to creditors, the owner will have purchased the debtor for
$50 less than its post-confirmation value. The only way to balance the equa-
tion, and achieve reasonable equivalence, is to force the transfer of the $50
contribution, directly or indirectly, to the creditors.
If creditors receive the extra $50, then they will have received $200, or
175. Case, 308 U.S. at 121 (1939).
176. Appendix A infra sets forth these relationships in more mathematical terms, and provides
examples of their application. See text accompanying notes 316-322 infra.
177. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 525-26 (1941); see also note 318
infra.
178. See RICHARD F. BROUDE, REORGANIZATIONS UNDER CHAPTER 11 Or THE CODE,
§ 13.01, at 13-5 (1991). For relatively sophisticated applications of this principle, see In re Pullman
Constr. Indus. Inc., 107 B.R. 909 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); In re Jartran, Inc., 44 Bankr. 331 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1984).
179. This number is derived by adding the original $200 in reorganization value to the $50
cash contribution, and then subtracting the $150 of reorganization debt. The sequence assumes that
the owner will contribute only if her plan is confirmed, which, given the uncertainties of confirma-
tion, is probably reflective of actual practice.
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the amount of preconfirmation reorganization value. At one level, this is
only fair. Postconfirmation value in an insolvent debtor exists only to the
extent that creditors' claims are discharged. 180 Cast a different way, credi-
tors participate in a reorganization based upon their antecedent debt, but
owners participate only on the basis of new value.
At a more important level, using Case to force creditors to receive an
amount equal to reorganization value is trivial. The absolute priority rule
itself requires that creditors participate in a reorganization in an amount
equal to the lesser of their claims or the debtor's reorganization value.181 In
an insolvent debtor, this means that creditors of an insolvent debtor are enti-
tled to property equal to reorganization value. But as indicated above, and
as shown in Appendix A,182 Case's new value standard yields the identical
result.
The interplay of these relationships means that any contribution of
money or money's worth permits owners to retain ownership so long as
creditors receive property equal to the debtor's reorganization value. This
result obtains, regardless of whether the inquiry starts with the absolute pri-
ority rule or Case's dicta. In one sense, this is all the creditors could expect.
Receipt of an amount equal to reorganization value is the most creditors
could expect outside of bankruptcy 83 or under fraudulent transfer law.
Moreover, this value probably represents the maximum amount a third
party would pay for the debt-free reorganized company. Regardless of ex-
pectations, however, creditors will receive the same amount under the abso-
lute priority rule as under the new value principles.
2. The consequences of equivalence.
Recognizing the equivalence between absolute priority and new value
principles has critical implications for the relative roles of owners and credi-
tors in business reorganizations. First, owners of an insolvent debtor need
not contribute anything to the reorganization if their plan allocates all reor-
ganization value to creditors.184 This means that once their plan allocates
all reorganization value to creditors, owners are not at risk for anything
other than their original risk capital. Their obligations as owners end. To
require otherwise would violate the nonbankruptcy concept of limited liabil-
ity, 8 5 and would deviate from the absolute priority rule's origins in fraudu-
180. Another way to interpret Case is that owners can enjoy the value created by the discharge
of creditors' claims only to the extent that the owners contribute money or money's worth.
181. See text accompanying notes 112-113 supra.
182. See text accompanying notes 316-322 infra.
183. In practice, it is probably more than creditors would receive. See text accompanying
notes 299-302 infra (asserting that the assumptions designed to augment reorganization value are
designed to discount market distaste for companies in bankruptcy, making ascertaining true reorgan-
ization value illusory).
184. This statement assumes that the other confirmation requirements have been met. See text
accompanying note 190 infra, (discussing adverse repercussions for owners who do not contribute
cash after allocating all value to creditors). The statement also assumes that there are no state law
theories under which creditors may pierce the corporate veil.
185. There are those who believe that the erosion of limited liability is not necessarily bad,
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lent transfer law. 18 6 As a corollary, owners who do not wish to bid for their
debtor may simply walk away, leaving the remains of the debtor to credi-
tors. 18 7 This result is not as harsh as it sounds. Plans which cancel all eq-
uity interests and issue stock to senior creditors are theoretically desirable' 88
and comply with the fair and equitable requirement. 189
Equivalence also has harsh consequences for owners. Allocation of all
reorganization value to creditors in the form of reorganization debt leaves a
truly valueless residual equity interest. In such circumstances if owners re-
tain the equity interest, confirmation of the reorganization plan may be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, without some contribution of additional value. The
owner, as mentioned above, must show that the postconfirmation debtor will
not need "further financial reorganization."' 190 Cash contributions may be
necessary to make this showing, as well as to supply working capital for the
reorganized debtor. 191 In short, business needs, not creditor claims, dictate
the need for owner contributions.
Equivalence highlights a deeper problem: defining and determining
value. If absolute priority is satisfied, creditors will receive all reorganiza-
tion value, leaving a valueless entity. If an owner nonetheless desires to con-
tribute more, then the owner appears irrational. A rational owner would not
invest in a worthless company. But if owners are acting rationally then there
must be some value they hope to capture by their contribution.' 92 If so,
Boyd requires that this value be allocated to the creditors, not purchased by
the owners in a transaction in which the creditors do not participate.
The apparent irrationality arises only if we believe that there is one fixed
especially if it preserves creditors' rights. See Daniel William Fessler, The Fate of Closely Held
Business Associations: The Debatable Wisdom of "Incorporation," 13 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 473
(1980); Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corpo-
rate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991).
186. See text accompanying notes 51-81 supra (discussing the role of fraudulent conveyance
law in shaping the absolute priority rule). The difference between aggregate creditors' claims and
reorganization value is discharged, 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1988), and creditors may not proceed against
the debtor to collect any portion of such deficiency. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1988).
187. This result can be accomplished in many ways. The owners could, for example, convert
the debtor's case from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (1988), or could consent to the
appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee, id. § 1104(a).
188. See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83
COLUM. L. RaV. 527 (1983).
189. See, eg., Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St.P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523
(1943).
190. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1988).
191. See, eg., In re Pullman Constr. Indus. Inc., 107 B.R. 909, 944-45 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
192. See, eg., Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th
Cir. 1990). In this case, Judge Easterbrook, capturing this tension, reviewed a claim that an owner's
guaranty of post-confirmation debt justified continuing the owners' equity interests. The owners
contended that the value of the guaranty exceeded the value of the retained equity interest. Judge
Easterbrook responded:
There is something unreal about this calculation. If the stock is worth less than the guar-
antees, why are [the owners] doing it? If the value of the stock is "minimal," why does
[the] Bank object to letting [the owners] keep it? Is everyone acting inconsistently with self-
interest, as the court's findings imply? And why, if the business is likely to fail, making
value of the stock "minimal," could the court confirm the plan of reorganization?
Id. at 1359; see also Ayer, supra note 17, at 1011-16.
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value upon which all parties agree. The setting of value is not so precise.
Reorganizations do not have the benefit of a fluid and functioning market.193
As a consequence, in valuing the debtor, participants-including courts-
rely upon educated guesses. 194 In short, the numerical value placed on a
debtor is not unique or determinative; it is simply the most likely number on
a probability distribution of possible values.195
Owners, if they are risk-taking entrepreneurs, may perceive a debtor's
value differently than risk averse creditors. Nonoperational reasons, such as
tax incidents of ownership 196 or sentimentality, 197 which increase the allure
of continued ownership, may also shape owners' perceptions of value. In
any of these situations, owners may be willing to risk additional personal
capital to preserve their preferences and perceptions and thus rationally buy
a debtor at a price which others believe exceeds the debtor's net worth.198
Owners who have higher private values, and who act upon them, either
seek to preserve values irrelevant to creditors, or simply choose a value
193. Several recent proposals attempt to finesse this lack of a market by creating market surro-
gates, Roe, supra note 188, or by pitting creditors against one another in a bidding contest, Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations; 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988). This
article's proposal on competing creditor plans, see text accompanying notes 309-315 infra, is in-
tended to be in the spirit of these proposals.
194. Peter Coogan is credited with noting that reorganization value is "a guess compounded by
an estimate." Peter F. Coogan, Confirmation of a Plan Under the Bankruptcy Code, 32 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 301, 313 n.62 (1982). Coogan was equivocal on whether the characterization was his.
IaL
195. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 2, at 745 & n.21. The Code generally does not assume
value to be a fixed amount, but rather the most likely amount. For example, if the value of a claim is
uncertain, then the Code permits it to be estimated, 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1988), and this may involve
taking into account various probabilities. See Bittner v. Borne Chem. Co., 691 F.2d 134 (3d Cir.
1982); see also 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988); SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUFrcY RE-
FORM ACT OF 1978, S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978) (stating that, in connection
with proposed Section 506, "valuation is to be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation
and the proposed disposition or use of the subject property").
196. See, eg., In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585, 588 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989) ("Existing joint
venturers have unique tax incentives to make the new investment. The $500,000 new investment is
far in excess of the value of the interest that the venturers will retain in the debtor.").
197. Eg, In re Eisenbarth, 77 B.L 228 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987); In re Pecht, 57 B.R. 137
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986).
198. Auction theory, described briefly at text accompanying notes 231-246 infra, reflects this
view. Models derived from auction theory center around two extreme cases: the independent pri-
vate values model and the common value model. Paul Milgrom, The Economics of Competitive
Bidding: A Selective Survey, in SOCIAL GOALS AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: ESSAYS IN MEMORY
OF ELISHA PAZNER 261, 264-66 (Leonid Hurwiz, David Schmeidler & Hugo Sonnenschein eds.,
1985) [hereinafter Milgrom, The Economics of Competitive Bidding]. Under variants of the in-
dependent private value model, values ascribed to an item auctioned differ with the bidders. R.
Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON. LITERATURE 699, 705
(1987). This difference could be due to sentimentality of the owner, or due to the different costs
faced by bidders in extracting value from the item bought. Id. at 705-06. Under the common value
model, the auctioned item has something closer to a single objective price. This characteristic may
be due to an active secondary market for the item, or the fact that the item's ultimate value may be
uncertain to all until more information is known. Auctions for oil leases in which a market price
exists for the oil, but where the amount of oil covered by the lease is unknown, may illustrate this
type of model. Id. at 705. In practice, valuation behavior at auctions generally tends to fall some-
where in between these extremes, making modeling a highly individual art which varies largely with
the preferences and types of expected bidders. Milgrom, The Economics of Competitive Bidding
supra at 266.
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higher than that acceptable to creditors for the creditors' continued partici-
pation. In neither situation is it necessarily the case that owners are arrogat-
ing to themselves value that could be transferred to creditors if creditors
simply extinguished their debt in exchange for all of the equity interests in
the debtor.
If owners as a group do have different perceptions of value, they may be
willing to bid for the debtor when others will not. This consequence carries
with it the possibility of abuse. Owners can bid low and seek to bluff credi-
tors as to reorganization value. If creditors fail to call this bluff, then owners
walk away with value that does not rightfully belong to them. Although
owners may be able to set the initial reorganization value, their use of that
value should be subject to inspection and overbid by creditors or others
whose own valuations may be influenced by owners' initial positions. 199 As
a result, the procedural protections developed in Boyd and Case become
relevant.
3. Summary.
The combination of the two Case requirements-fresh value and reason-
able equivalence-merely rephrases the absolute priority rule. As such,
Case's new value principles cannot constitute an exception to the absolute
priority rule. Justice Douglas knew, or should have known, this. Railroad
reorganizations relied heavily upon shareholders retaining interests worth
more than their assessments, 2°° thus transferring value to junior classes at
the expense of senior classes. Boyd, literally read, barred this result.
If the new value principles were intended as a true suspension of absolute
priority, Justice Douglas could have stated that when creditors demonstrate
necessity, relative rather than absolute priority governs. But he did not.
Case purports both to preserve owners' ability to participate and to eliminate
owners' ability to receive stock worth more than their contribution. It does
this by permitting participation, but only at levels reasonably equivalent to
the continued participation. Reasonable equivalency, however, assumes that
one can fix one end of the equation: creditors' entitlements. Through an
absolute priority rule that fixes creditors' entitlement at reorganization
value, the Court made value comparisons of preconfirmation contributions
and post-confirmation interests possible. The Court failed, however, to cre-
ate a separate valuation process for debtors when owners participate. In
short, the Court created no exception.
The complexities of the new value issue and its ubiquitous nature have
caused some to adopt Alexander's approach to the Gordian knot: slice
through history and find that the Code eliminated the new value doctrine. 201
199. See text accompanying notes 309-315 infra (suggesting a solution to the problem).
200. See Swaine, supra note 35.
201. See, eg., In re Rudy Debruycker Ranch, Inc., 84 B.R. 187, 190 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1988)
("ITihe easy answer is that inferred by the Ahlers case, namely, there are no exceptions to the abso-
lute priority rule as codified by the 1978 Code. Thus, the only way the rule is satisfied is by payment
in full of the senior class."); see also In re Drimmel, 108 B.R. 284 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989); In re 47th
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If this elimination is done without an appreciation of what is being dis-
carded, or why, this approach is unsatisfactory.
C. The Canard of Noncodification
Elimination of the "new value" controversy would be relatively simple if
the Code explicitly and completely defined the fair and equitable require-
ment. Courts could disregard Case and all associated precedent. But this
avenue of attack ignores the fact that Congress neither intended nor made
such a statutory statement. Inquiry along these lines thus diverts attention
away from the primary task of setting rules according to which equity own-
ers can participate. More importantly, uncritical dismissal of Case's formu-
lation of the new value principles could wreak interpretive havoc with the
absolute priority rule. As shown above, the exception simply reworks the
rule itself.20 2 It would thus be an antinomy to dismiss the logic and text of
Case's dicta without also dismissing the absolute priority rule.
Finally, interpreting Case to require more from owners in bankruptcy
than in nonbankruptcy liquidation schemes undercuts both the rule's origins
in fraudulent conveyance law and nonbankruptcy concepts of limited liabil-
ity. If owners in bankruptcy must pay more than required under state law,
Chapter 11 loses much of its allure. Such an interpretation of Case would
discriminate against owners with money to invest, and could deprive credi-
tors of increased dividends. Thus, although somewhat of a deviation, it is
appropriate to dismiss the argument that the Code abolished Case's dicta.
Several arguments for abandoning the Case dicta have been pressed. One
common argument for elimination lies in the absence of any "exception"
from absolute priority in the text of the Code. Because the Supreme Court is
clear that the starting place for analysis of the Code is its text, 20 3 the argu-
ment concludes that this omission is evidence that Congress intended to
eliminate the new value principles from reorganizations. One must grant the
initial premise of this argument: nothing resembling Case's dicta appears in
the Code.204 But the Code's structure does not support the major premise
that omission is exclusion.20 5
& Belleview Partners, 95 B.R. 117 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988). The Solicitor General suggested this
approach in Ahlers. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 22, Norwest Bank Worthington
v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988) (No. 86-958).
202. See text accompanying notes 316-322 infra.
203. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989). But cf Grogan v.
Garner, 111 S. Ct. 654 (1991) (using prior law and inferred legislative intent to determine the appro-
priate quantum of evidence in dischargeability proceedings).
204. But then, nothing similar to Case's dicta appeared in § 77B either, and Justice Douglas
did not seem bothered by the lacuna.
205. The Court also seems to have retreated somewhat from Ron Pair's strict view. In Grogan,
the Court embraced the notion that a determination of plain meaning necessarily requires looking to
the text of the statute and " 'to the design of the statute and to its object and policy.'" 111 S. Ct. at
659 n.13 (quoting Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152 (1990)). See also Johnson v. Home State
Bank, 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991) (using context and legislative history to supply meaning to "claim");
Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197 (1991) (using the same method to determine the eligibility of an
individual to file under Chapter 11). Moreover, neither Grogan, Johnson, nor Toibb cite Ron Pair.
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As shown above, early drafts of the Code attempted to define "fair and
equitable."'206 Congress eventually discarded this approach and adopted the
historical language as the standard.207 This standard, however, is then Mu-
minated by nonexclusive examples of compliance with the fair and equitable
rule contained in a different subsection.208 Thus, although it is true that no
mention of an exception is found in the Code, it is also true that no inference
can be made from that exclusion.
Similarly, some may argue that Congress's rejection of the Commission's
proposal to relax the rule also rejected the new value exception. This argu-
ment sweeps too broadly. The Commission's proposals assumed the exist-
ence of an exception. The proposed changes were no more than rather
moderate tinkering with the list of qualifying contributions and the eviden-
tiary standard necessary to establish value.2°9 As a consequence, one cannot
infer that rejection of the Commission proposal constituted wholesale disap-
proval of the new value rule. Rather, it only rejected the Commission's pro-
posed relaxation of the rule's requirements.
IV. OWNER PARTICIPATION UNDER THE CODE
A. The Owner Participation Debate
If a new value "exception" did not and does not exist, then the natural
follow-up question is what accommodation, if any, should exist for owners of
a Chapter 11 business? Initially, one might look for guidance to the stated
reason for an exception--owners are the bank of last resort to fund working
capital needs. 210 Other justifications may also exist. As mentioned above,
owners may have non-operating incentives, such as minimizing tax incidents
of their ownership to preserve their equity positions. 211 In addition, owners
may know more about the debtor than third parties. As a result of this
information, owners may invest more confidently in the business. 2 12 Finally,
owners as a group may be more entrepreneurial. They may take risks more
than on average. Given that business valuations are at best an average of a
206. See note 124 supra.
207. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (b)(1) (1988).
208. See id § 1129(b)(2) (listing examples of compliance with the fair and equitable rule and
stating that "the condition that the plan be fair and equitable with respect to a class includes [those]
requirements"). Section 102(3) reminds us that within the Code, the term "includes" is not limiting.
Id § 102(3).
209. As previously set forth, the compromise between the National Conference of Bankruptcy
Judges and the National Bankruptcy Conference rejected this expansion. See text accompanying
notes 121-123 supra. The two groups rejected the proposals because class waiver accomplished more
for debtors than delayed participation ever could.
210. Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445, 455 (1926); see also
SEC REPORT, supra note 19, pt. 8, at 55 (1940). This may still be the case. See, eg., In re Mortgage
Inv. Co., 111 B.R. 604, 619 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 B.R.
560, 574 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
211. See, eg., In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585, 588 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989) ("No sane outside
investor would put new money in this project .... Existing joint venturers have unique tax incen-
tives to make this new investment."); see also text accompanying notes 196-197 supra.
212. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 2, at 745-46.
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range of estimates, risk-taking owners may be more likely to believe that the
upper ranges of possible estimates are more accurate than the lower or mid-
dle ranges.
Although each of these observations may have some independent valid-
ity, none address the absolute priority rule's core concern of ensuring pay-
ment to creditors of all reorganization value before any distributions to
owners occur.2 13 If an exception to this rule should be made, then there
ought to be at least some showing that the exception's expected benefits to
someone other than owners exceeds its harms to creditors. That no such
analytical showing has yet been made is due to an irreducible fact: owners'
contributions to debtors, without more, do not benefit creditors at all.
Plans which propose to cash out existing creditors for a small percentage
of their allowed claims demonstrate this point. Creditors in such cases re-
ceive nothing more than cash equal to a portion of their claim;2 14 they are
denied the option to participate in the reorganized debtor. As a result, the
benefits that accrue to continued ownership are held solely by owners.
Creditors also fail to receive any benefit under plans that issue long term
debt in exchange for a discharge, or under plans that allocate less than all of
the new debtor's equity interests to creditors. In these cases, it is arguable
that the contribution strengthens the reorganized entity, and in turn, makes
a successful reorganization more likely.215 Reorganized debtors, however,
ought not to be hobbled with debt. Contributions that merely facilitate serv-
icing postconfirmation reorganization debt should instead be used to satisfy
prepetition debt. Otherwise, owners abuse the reorganization process by
leveraging their new investment and reducing, through application of limited
liability principles, their postconfirmation risk.216
213. This concern obviously recedes to nothing if creditors are paid in full or are otherwise
unimpaired. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1) (1988). The Code conclusively presumes acceptance of a
plan by any such unimpaired class. Id. § 1126(0. The fair and equitable requirement, in turn, only
applies to dissenting classes, id. § 1129(b)(1), which unimpaired classes can never be.
214. The remainder of the claims will be rendered unenforceable by the discharge granted
upon confirmation. Id. § 1141 (providing for treatment of any claim only as specified in Chapter I 1
plan, and for discharge of claims to the extent that there is no provision for them).
The tactic discussed in the text is often employed by owners. See, eg., Official Creditors'
Comm. ex rel. Class 8 Unsecured Creditors v. Potter Material Serv., Inc., (In re Potter Material
Serv., Inc.), 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986); In re Ashton, 107 B.R. 670, 674 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1989); In
re Snyder, 105 B.R. 898, 902-03 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989); In re Eaton Hose and Fitting Co., 73 B.R.
139 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987).
215. Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2., Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1359 (7th
Cir. 1990) (rejecting proposed contribution of a guaranty by a shareholder); In re 222 Liberty As-
socs., 108 B.R. 971, 984-85 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); In re Pullman Constr. Indust. Inc., 107 B.R.
909, 944-45 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
216. Such an argument makes the required showing of feasibility, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)
(1988), a nullity. See In re Drimmel, 108 B.R. 284, 290 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989), in which the court
recognized that:
What is actually sought by the debtor under their plans and the Los Angeles Lumber
exception is the right to buy the business without following § 363 or § 1123(a)(5)(D) and
§ 1129(a)(1 1), while using § 1129(b)(2)(A) cram down to force secured creditors to provide
100% loan-to-value financing for their collateral and ignoring the right to full payment
granted unsecured creditors under § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i).
Id.; see also In re Snyder, 105 B.R. 898 (treating issues separately).
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Moreover, although creditors receiving less than all of the equity inter-
ests under a plan benefit from an owner's contribution, that benefit is attenu-
ated. Any exception to absolute priority translates into less than full
payment of reorganization value to creditors. If existing equity interests re-
tain or pay for an interest, then the remaining reorganization value goes to
the owners. The result is exactly what Case and its predecessors decried:
the arrogation by owners to themselves of value properly belonging to
creditors.
In short, any nexus between traditional justifications for owner contribu-
tions and any benefit to creditors from the continuation of the business is too
attenuated to justify an exception. Each of the arguments above boils down
to owners' attempts to capture for themselves the difference between reor-
ganization value and the amount of plan payments to creditors.217 The lack
of an undiminished link between the contribution made and the benefit con-
ferred dooms any attempt to base an exception in any system retaining abso-
lute priority as axiomatic. It also creates an opportunity for adroit owners of
Chapter 11 debtors to siphon value from creditors to themselves or to their
business.
Furthermore, even if the "exception" is viewed benignly as a safe harbor,
presumptively avoiding the appearance of the type of collusion Boyd con-
demned, it is no longer necessary. First, unsecured creditors can no longer
be dealt with outside of the reorganization. The Code requires the debtor to
classify, and specify the treatment of, all creditors in the plan.218 Moreover,
any confirmed plan binds all creditors with notice of the plan.219 In contrast
to the perceived need in equity receiverships, there is no legal reason to be
concerned with the construction of a substantively fair offer. Statutes, fur-
thermore, have replaced the concepts of waiver by inaction and estoppel as
the basis of debt discharge. Under these statutes, creditors' votes to accept a
plan, not judicial opinion as to the plan's fairness, control. Second, the
Code's relaxation of the absolute priority rule to allow class waiver 220 has
decreased the need to create an exception to protect owners from a single,
irrational creditor. With class waiver, the task is much more daunting, and
presumably requires categorizing the choice of an entire class of creditors as
irrational. 221
What role, then, for the owner? Although traditional justifications do
217. This practice is similar to the equity reorganization tactic of assessing old shareholders a
price less than the worth of the new stock issued (or retained) by them. In both cases owners receive
(or retain) ownership interests of a value higher than that contributed. Moreover, the aggregate
amount of value in each instance is the differential noted above.
218. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(l)-(3) (1988).
219. Id. § 1141.
220. Balloting in Chapter I1 is by classes of claims as specified in the proposed plan of reorgan-
ization. See id. § 1126(c). The non-consensual confirmation provisions are invoked only when the
plan proponent fails to secure the affirmative vote of all impaired classes of claims. Id. § 1129(b)(1).
221. This argument is not valid for secured creditors, who typically comprise their own class.
See R. BROUDE supra note 178, § 9.021]. In such cases, however, § 1126(e) assists the plan propo-
nent by allowing the disqualification of those votes cast in bad faith or for an improper purpose. Id
§ 1126(e).
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not support an exception to absolute priority, it does not follow that courts
should exclude owners completely. After all, basic compliance with Case is
compliance with the absolute priority rule. But ill will against owners per-
sists. The remainder of this section analyzes arguments that can be made in
favor of owner participation.
1. The first argument: nondiscrimination.
The first argument for owner participation is simple. Creditors should
not care about the source of their creditor dividends. A court may confirm a
plan in which a third party acquires the debtor, either through a sale of all
assets, through a corporate merger, or through other means of consolida-
tion.2 2 2 Creditor treatment will not vary if an owner promulgates the same
plan.223 In short, owners' money should be no different than funds provided
by a third party investor.
So phrased, the concern over owner participation appears trivial. Why
should anyone reject the same amount of money simply because it comes
from an owner instead of a stranger? The real problem, however, is that the
identity of the contributors may affect how creditors perceive the desirability
of the reorganization plan. Owners have the motive and opportunity to ma-
nipulate the bankruptcy process through, for example, unprincipled use of
plan exclusivity. This potential for manipulation may provide a basis for
creditors' perceptions that third party valuations are more trustworthy than
owner valuations. 224
This concern over potential abuse also implicitly assumes that owner
participation is undesirable to the point of its exclusion. But other vehicles
for preventing owner manipulation exist. If owners, for example, under-
capitalize the prepetition debtor or act inequitably to the detriment of credi-
tors, then creditors may subordinate payment of owners' claims to the full
payment of creditors' claims.2 25 Furthermore, if owners' inept or dishonest
management caused the debtor's financial problems, certain confirmation re-
quirements may bar further owner participation. First, the plan proponent
must appoint management for the reorganized debtor whose service does not
violate the public interest.226 Second, if an owner's demonstrable lack of
222. Id. § 1 123(a)(5)(B) (plan may call for transfer of debtor's assets to another entity, even if
formed specifically for that purpose); id. § 1123(a)(5)(C) (plan may call for merger or consolidation
of debtor with another entity); id. § 1123(a)(5)(D) (plan may call for sale of all of debtor's assets).
The acquiring entity cannot, however, be a mere sham. See In re Perdido Motel Group, Inc., 101
B.R. 289, 292 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989) (denying confirmation of plan in which acquiring entity was
new corporation, capitalized at $1000, and controlled by insiders).
223. This statement assumes that both the third party plan and the owners' similar plan satisfy
the absolute priority rule. This assumption seems reasonable; to eliminate equity, a third party
would have to show that such class of interests has no value, and that the price paid is equivalent to
the interest retained. Substitution of an owner for the third party does not change this analysis.
224. This concern traces back to Boyd and its rejection of hypothetical valuations in favor of
the valuations upon which owners and creditors actually rely. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228
U.S. 482, 506-08 (1913).
225. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1988).
226. Id. § 1129(a)(5).
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skill in financial matters caused the debtor's downfall, it would be difficult
for the debtor to show that a plan according to which the same owner retains
control will not require "further financial reorganization." 227 If the absolute
priority rule were expanded to prohibit all participation by owners, then
these rules would be meaningless.
While there is no doubt that owner participation can be undesirable,
analysis of the role of the owner in the reorganization process reveals distinct
benefits from owner participation.
2. The second argument: insights from auction theory.
Any plan sponsored by an owner signals at least two facts. First, it sig-
nals that the owners believe the reorganized debtor has positive value. Sec-
ond, the plan's terms, especially the consideration offered, convey some
impression of the owners' belief of the amount of that value. This informa-
tion, although minimal, can be important.
Insights from auction theory can help creditors and potential investors to
quantify the owners' perceived value of the debtor, and can facilitate the
transfer of that value to the debtors' creditors. Auctions and reorganizations
possess key structural similarities. At stake in any business reorganization is
the control of the postconfirmation debtor. The process of obtaining that
control, however, is unlike that which occurs in a typical business acquisi-
tion. In nonbankruptcy contexts, parties bargain over the price of control
and then execute binding contracts to memorialize the deal they reach.228
The affirmative approval of the substantive terms of the transaction by a
government agency or court is rarely required.
In bankruptcy, as stated above, the process differs. Plan proponents at-
tempt to win support of creditors and other participants through their plan's
allocation of plan consideration. 229 With some limitations on who may sub-
mit an initial plan,230 the court may hear and consider competing bids at any
time prior to confirmation. The bids may be considered in their own right,
or as objections to a proposed plan.23 1 In the end, the bankruptcy court will
confirm only one plan, although the confirmed plan will not be identified
until the confirmation hearings, which occur at the end of the process. 232 In
short, no deal is final until confirmation. It is always subject to overbid.
227. Id. § 1129(a)(1 1).
228. There are limits to this freedom of contract, especially in the case of public companies.
See Erica M. Ryland, Note, Bracing for the "Failure Boom" Should a Revlon Auction Duty Arise in
Chapter 11?, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2255, 2256-58 (1990).
229. Reorganizations in which the debtor's assets are sold in bulk illustrate this proposition.
11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(D) (1988).
230. This statement is subject to the effects of debtor's exclusivity. M, § 1121(b); see notes 289-
293 infra (discussing the effects of debtor's exclusivity).
231. Some courts have allowed creditors and equity interests to review competing plans. See
In re UVAS Farming Corp., 91 B.R. 579 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1988) (allowing two competing share-
holder factions to promulgate competing plans); In re Evans Prod. Co., 65 B.R. 31 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1986) (allowing three competing plans to be voted on by creditors).
232. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(c).
November 1991]
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
Auctions share this feature. Each bidder in an English increasing-bid
auction 233 wrests the bid from the last bidder by its own bid. Nothing is
final until the hammer drops. In other words, both auctions and reorganiza-
tions share a feature not present in normal contracting: once the bidding is
initiated, the seller typically cannot stop the process and bind itself to any
one bidder. An auctioneer keeps the auction going until the bidding stops at
the highest price; similarly, a plan of reorganization is subject to competing
plans that offer different or higher consideration.
Admittedly, there are differences. The auction for control of a reorga-
nized debtor generally operates within a longer time frame. Auctions typi-
cally are conducted in one sitting; reorganizations can take months or
years.234 This extended time frame highlights another difference. Auctions
are usually perceived as cash and carry.235 Reorganizations, in contrast,
may yield cash substitutes such as reorganization debt or equity securities;
there may be terms other than price that become relevant.236 Finally, the
extended time frame and the flexibility of the form of consideration require
discounting the various offers to present value, a process generally absent in
auctions.237
But these differences are relatively minor. Differences in time and in the
quality of securities ultimately condense into questions of value. As a conse-
quence, the strategies adopted by bidders at auctions are likely to be similar
to the strategies adopted by plan proponents in a contested reorganization.
If the analogy between auctions and reorganizations is valid, auction the-
ory can provide a highly evolved attempt to model the underlying economic
233. Auctions exist in many forms. 1 TH NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS,
Auctions 138-44 (John Eatwell, Muray Milgate & Peter Newman, eds. 1987). The most common is
the English increasing-bid auction. Id at 138. In this type of auction, an auctioneer solicits increas-
ing oral bids with the final bid obtaining the item auctioned. In a Dutch auction the seller starts with
a high price and lowers it by increments until a bidder accepts. Id In a first price auction, bidders
dispense with the oral outcry. Instead, they engage in one round of bidding which consists of the
submission of sealed written bids. The highest bid wins. Id at 138-39. The United States Treasury
auctions securities in this manner. Id. at 139. Finally, in second price auctions, sealed bids are
submitted, and the second highest bid wins. Id. at 138. The United States Treasury has experi-
mented with variants of second price bids, and Citicorp and Exxon have each issued securities using
this method. Id.; see also RALPH CASSADY, JR., AuCTIONs AND AUCriONEERING 56-81 (1967);
BtAN LEAnmouNT, A HisTORY OF THE AUCTION 127-37 (1985). Much of auction theory at-
tempts to select the form of auction that is optimal from the seller's perspective. See note 238 infia.
234. Many auctions, however, give prospective bidders advance notice of the sale and allow
them to view the items auctioned. See R. CASSADY, JR., supra note 233, at 143-44. This time lag
and opportunity to inspect can provide information to bidders to help them formulate their own
assessment of the auctioned item's worth and, derivatively, their bidding strategy.
235. Id at 135.
236. For example, a creditor may select a creditor-sponsored plan over an owner-sponsored
plan for which the consideration is nominally higher, because the creditor discounts the owner's plan
consideration due to the owner's participation.
237. To carry the auction analogy further, the winning bid in an English auction is typically
the highest offer. The prevailing plan in reorganizations is the plan that receives confirmation. All
other things being equal and creditors being revenue maximizers, the plan which offers the most to
creditors will be accepted. Creditor preference, in turn, should be determinative when more than
one plan meets Chapter 11's confirmation standards. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(c) (1988).
[Vol. 44:69
November 1991] BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZA TIONS
assumptions found in the reorganization setting.238 These models can be
applied to the reorganization context to derive optimal strategies for con-
struction of an auction system.239 Auction theory, for example, can assist
the bankruptcy reorganization process by providing bases from which to se-
lect the optimal form of the auction.24° It can also identify aspects and fac-
tors of different forms of auctions that will tend to maximize the revenue
received.24 1
In particular, auction theory suggests that owner participation can in-
crease the final bid price, and thus the return to creditors, in at least two
ways.242 First, recent studies indicate that an increase in the number of bid-
ders tends to increase the final bid price.243 If owners may bid, this increases
the pool of potential bidders. In theory, the increased competition for the
reorganized debtor will lead to a higher acquisition price. Anecdotal evi-
dence in bankruptcy tends to confirm this theory. More bidders mean
238. See, ag., I THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICrIONARY OF ECONOMICS, Auctions; supra note
233, at 138-44.
A wealth of theoretical work exists with respect to auctions. See, eg., McAfee & McMillan,
supra note 198; Paul Milgrom, Auction Theory, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY: FIFrH
WORLD CONGRESS I (Truman F. Bewley ed., 1987) [hereinafter Milgrom, Auction Theory]; Mil-
grom, The Economics of Competitive Bidding, supra note 198, at 261; Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J.
Weber, A Theory ofAuctions and Competitive Bidding, 50 EONOMETRICA 1089 (1982); William E.
Vickery, Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders; 16 J. FIN. 8 (1961); see also
Steven B. Katz, Note, Designing and Executing a "Fair" Revlon Auction, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.
163 (1989) (applying auction theory to the design of auctions of corporate assets mandated by Rev-
Ion, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)).
This abundance of literature is not surprising. Auctions have a respectable and aged pedigree.
See R. CASSADY, JR., supra note 233, at 28-29. Indeed, the first case in the first casebook dealt with
an auction: CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS 1 (1871).
239. Auction theory can be viewed as a form of applied game theory. For an excellent intro-
duction of the application of game theory to legal studies, see Ian Ayers, Playing Games with the
Law, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1291 (1990) (book review). Professor Ayers reviews ERIC RASMUSSEN,
GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY (Basil Blackwell ed., 1989),
which is an excellent and accessible introduction to game theory generally. For an application of
game theory to bankruptcy that differs from the approach taken in this article, see Douglas G. Baird
& Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations; 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 311 (1991).
240. See note 238 supra; see also Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Allocation Mechanisms and the
Design of Auctions, 49 ECONOMETRICA 1477 (1981); Eric Maskin & John Riley, Optimal Auctions
with Risk Averse Buyers, 52 ECONOMETRICA 1473 (1984).
241. See, eg., McAfee & McMillan, supra note 198, at 711-14; Milgrom, Auction Theory, supra
note 238, at 16-26.
242. Any rigorous adaptation of auction theory to Chapter 11 reorganizations would incorpo-
rate the already noted differences between the two, and would probably take into account the effect
of other differences. This article, however, does not attempt such a goal. Rather, given the fluid
setting of most bankruptcies, it uses the strong analytic similarity between auctions and reorganiza-
tion confirmation to attempt to provide broad justifications for owner participation in business reor-
ganizations. In this regard, it does not attempt to construct specific strategies applicable to
participants in reorganizations. For an attempt to transfer auction principles on a more detailed
scale to changes of control in public companies, see Katz, supra note 238.
243. See, e-g., Lance Brannman, J. Douglas Klein & Leonard W. Weiss, Concentration and
Vinning Bids in Auctions, 29 ANTrrrusT BULL. 27, 30-31 (1984); Charles A. Holt, Jr., Uncertainty
and the Bidding for Incentive Contracts 69 Am. ECON. REv. 697 (1979); McAfee & McMillan, supra
note 198, at 710-11.
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higher dividends.244
Second, owner bidding provides relevant information to other potential
bidders. It signals a price which knowledgeable insiders are willing to pay,
or at least a price at which they wish to start the bidding. Auction theory
anticipates that providing maximum information, including any other bid-
der's valuation, increases seller's revenue.245 Indeed, one of the leading
scholars in this field, Paul Milgrom, has called the link between the reduc-
tion of private information held by bidders and the increase of seller's reve-
nues the "common thread" running through auction theory.246
The logic behind Professor Milgrom's insight is simple. The existence
and availability of information from owners or any other source reduces bid-
ders' uncertainty and assists bidders in ascribing a value to the item auc-
tioned.247 It also reduces or eliminates the value of each bidder's private or
exclusive information about the debtor. As more information is disclosed
and the amount of private information is reduced, the ability of each bidder
244. In re Lionel, 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983), provides an interesting example of this effect.
There, the debtor's management agreed to sell the debtor's 82% stake in a valuable subsidiary for
$43 million. After a hearing contesting the sale, at which three other bidders appeared and at-
tempted to bid, a new contract of sale was entered into for $50 million. Equity holders thought the
stock was worth more and appealed. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the circum-
stances did not warrant the expedited sale, and reversed. On remand, a new bidding procedure was
used, the $50 million bidder having dropped out, which yielded a final sale price of $76,865,000.
Matt Perry, Joint Venture Beats DCA for Lionel's 82% Dale Stake, 31 ELECTRONIC NEWs 43
(1985).
The battle for acquisition of Financial News Network ("FNN") provides a more recent example
of the power of auctions to increase bids. There, a joint venture between Dow Jones & Co. and
Group W Satellite Communications agreed to pay $90 million for FNN's assets, the purchase to be
made from FNN's Chapter 11 bankruptcy estate. Kevin Goldman, Dow Jones-Westinghouse Group,
NBC Sweeten Their Bids at Auction for FNN, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1991, at B6. After FNN's filing,
a unit of the National Broadcasting Company appeared, and ultimately bid $115 million for FNN.
When the joint venture responded by bidding $115 million as well, the bankruptcy court ordered an
auction. The results were dramatic: the joint venture increased its bid to $167.1 million, of which
$125 million was to be paid in cash, and NBC bid $146 million, of which $140 million was to be paid
cash. Id. Since FNN owed its creditors $145.4 million, the auction boosted their return from a 62%
dividend to payment in full.
A final example is the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of DeLaurentiis Entertainment Group, Inc..
There, a third party, Carolco Pictures, Inc., initially agreed to acquire the debtor for $18.5 million.
See Kathleen A. Hughes, Carolco Pictures Expects to Acquire De Laurentiis [sic] Firm, WALL ST. J.,
March 6, 1989, at B5. The debtor's owners mounted a competing bid, with the final price rising to
$39 million. Debtors' Joint disclosure Statement Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code
for the Debtors' Modified Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization (Mar. 1, 1990) at 14-16, In
re DeLaurentiis Entertainment Group Inc., Case No. LA-88-17251-AA (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990).
245. Milgrom, Auction Theory, supra note 238, at 4-5; Milgrom, The Economics of Competitive
Bidding, supra note 198, at 278-80; Milgrom & Weber, supra note 238, at 1112.
246. Milgrom, Auction Theory, supra note 238, at 20 n.24; Milgrom & Weber, supra note 238,
at 1110-11. Milgrom's formulation focuses on the reduction of profits of bidders through the use of
private information. "The intuition ... is that the auctions yielding the highest average prices are
those that are most effective at undermining the privacy of the winning bidder's information, thereby
transferring [sic] some profits from the bidders to the seller." Id at 4; see also Christopher D. Hall,
A Dutch Auction Information Exchange, 32 J. L. & EcON. 195 (1989) (exploring information trans-
mitting function of Dutch auction rules and practices); Kenneth Hendricks & Robert H. Porter, An
Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information, 78 Am. EcON. REv. 865 (1988) (ex-
ploring informational advantages inherent in oil leasing auctions when bidder owns leasing tracts
close to tracts being auctioned).
247. Each bid discloses that one player believes that the item auctioned has that value. This
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to extract a profit based upon secret or exclusive information diminishes.
Other bidders will incorporate the information into their bids and increase
them accordingly. This reduces the profit the bidder possessing exclusive
information can extract based upon that information.
Practice in acquisitions reflects this insight. Rare is the nonbankruptcy
acquisition that proceeds without "due diligence." In bankruptcy, the Bank-
ruptcy Rules anticipate similar concerns and explicitly allow parties to com-
pel any entity to provide information in connection with the confirmation of
a plan.248
3. Summary.
The lack of a necessary connection between owners' contributions and
creditors' benefits dooms any exception to the absolute priority rule, at least
from the perspective of the direct participants. 249 But this conclusion does
not lead to outright rejection of owner participation. Owner bids can in-
crease creditor dividends in at least two ways. First, they may increase com-
petition with other bids. Second, they may make more and potentially
higher quality information available to all bidders. As long as the rules for
owner participation are fair to others, and the absolute priority rule is met,
the Code should not be construed to prevent owners from bidding for their
companies.
Two impediments, however, interfere with this argument. First, owners
are handicapped by Case's necessity requirement. Under some views of this
dicta, owners must show that their contributions are the only possible
sources of new and required capital. 250 Second, creditors and third-party
investors are impeded by many of the Code's innovations which unfairly
skew the reorganization process in owners' favor. Owners, for example, ini-
tially have the power to exclude competing plans. Even if they lose this
power, they may manipulate confirmation and valuation rules to force com-
petitors into settlements not warranted by their relative position. Presented
below is a proposal that addresses these concerns.
fact both confirms other bidders' notions of similar value and may provide a base upon which to
further increase the price.
Owners are in a unique position to convey this type of information through a bid price. They
have a greater ease of access to relevant business information and have a greater experience with the
debtor's business and operating procedures. Their bid can be said to quantify this collection of
information.
248. BAN R. RULE 2004(b) (1991) (court may order the examination of any party, and the
examination may "relate to the operation of any business and the desirability of its continuance ....
and any other matter relevant to ... the formulation of a plan").
249. The analysis, of course, discounts certain remote externalities, such as any benefit to the
debtor's community from continued operations.
250. See, eg., In re Mortgage Inv. Co., IlI B.R. 604, 619-20 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (requir-
ing a rigorous showing of necessity, which "serves 'the narrow purpose of affording the debtor the
capital necessary to survive' ") (quoting In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 B.R. 560, 575
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989)).
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B. New Wine in Old Bottles: A Proposal for Fair Owner Participation
1. Case reconsidered.
If reasons exist to permit owners to participate in the reorganization pro-
cess, then how should we facilitate that participation? Before the Code's
adoption, the standard answer was to follow Case and aligned precedents.
Courts have used this answer even after adoption of the Code. This is not
surprising: Congress incorporated prior decisional law through the adoption
of old terms of art, such as the fair and equitable standard, and left the
charting of the contours of the fair and equitable requirement to the
judiciary.251
Most of this received learning, however, is based upon the false premise
that Case's new value principles constitute an exception to absolute prior-
ity.252 As discussed above,25 3 that premise is invalid. What effect does this
realization have upon courts who must deal with Case? If courts desire to
capture the gains from owner participation outlined above, then the answer
is not much. Because of the equivalence of the absolute priority rule and the
Case dicta, compliance with Case is compliance with the absolute priority
rule.
But Case goes beyond the absolute priority rule. It assumes that there
will be "the necessity, at times, of seeking new money 'essential to the suc-
cess of the undertaking' from the old stockholders. ' '254 Only "[w]here that
necessity exists, ' '255 may owners participate. This necessity requirement ob-
viously impedes owners. They suffer under a requirement that is inapplica-
ble to others. As the rule was judicially created, the judiciary may amend or
delete it if its underlying logic is no longer valid.25 6
2. Discarding necessity.
Case and some of its progeny explicitly condition owner participation
upon a showing that an owner's contribution is "necessary. '257 This re-
251. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
252. See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
253. See text accompanying notes 167-201 supra; text accompanying notes 316-322 infra.
254. Case, 308 U.S. at 121 (footnote omitted); see text accompanying note 250 supra.
255. Case 308 U.S. at 121.
256. As noted when the Code was in its final stages of consideration:
Although many of the factors interpreting "fair and equitable" are specified in paragraph
(2), others, which were explicated in the description of section 1129(b) in the House report,
were omitted from the House amendment to avoid statutory complexity and because they
would undoubtedly be found by a court to be fundamental to "fair and equitable' treatment
of a dissenting class. For example, a dissenting class should be assured that no senior class
receives more than 100 percent of the amount of its claims. While that requirement was
explicitly included in the House bill, the deletion is intended to be one of style and not one
of substance.
124 CONG. REc. 32,407 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (emphasis added); id. at 34,006 (1978)
(statement of Sen. DeConcini) (emphasis added).
257. See, eg., In re Mortgage Inv. Co., 111 B.R. 604, 619 & n.25 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In
re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585, 588 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989); In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 102
B.R. 560, 574 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989), aff'd, 127 B.R. 138 (W.D. Tex 1990).
Several courts have noted the necessity requirement, but have not required an affirmative show-
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quirement may not have continuing vitality due to its origins in the false
belief that Case provides an exception to the absolute priority rule. As
shown above, Case contains no such exception.258 Owners who comply with
the Case dicta effectively comply with absolute priority. It is thus odd and
potentially detrimental to impose upon owners a condition that is not appli-
cable to any other class of participants. At best, the necessity rule may help
differentiate owners who wish to continue in good faith from those who wish
to exploit their position. But this is a loose fit, and other existing rules ad-
dress the problem more directly.259
New funds were often thought necessary in equity reorganizations to pay
cash to dissenters. 26° But the Code contains significant changes to equity
reorganization practice. In particular, it grants a broad discharge.261 As a
result, dissenters need not be paid in full, or provided for other than as set
forth in the terms of the confirmed plan. The cost of this capital was one
focus in Case.
Justice Douglas also stated that new funds were often necessary to pro-
vide working capital in railroad reorganizations.262 By imposing a necessity
requirement, Justice Douglas attempted to ensure that old shareholders
would supply funds and retain their interest only when the market did not
provide this working capital at a lower cost.263 But in reorganizations under
the Code, cash is required only to the extent necessary to meet the feasibility
requirement. 264 If a debtor requires large infusions of cash to continue oper-
ations in the near term, there is substantial doubt that a Court will consider
the plan feasible.
The decline in the need for cash to pay dissenters together with the
demonstrated equivalence of Case with the absolute priority rule diminish
the need for the necessity rule.265 Thus rethought, the rule should be
ing of necessity by owners unless plan opponents raise the issue. Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indust.
Negotiating Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co., Inc. (In re U.S. Truck Co., Inc.), 800 F.2d 581, 588 n.10 (6th
Cir. 1986); Official Creditors' Comm. ex reL Class 8 Unsecured Creditors v. Potter Material Serv.,
Inc. (In re Potter Material Serv., Inc.), 781 F.2d 99, 102 (7th Cir. 1986).
258. See text accompanying notes 167-201 supra.
259. See, eg., 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (1988) (plan must be proposed in good faith).
260. Case, 308 U.S. at 121 n.15; see also 2 A.S. DEWING, supra note 30, at 1427-33.
261. The Code provides that:
The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor, any entity issuing securities under the
plan, any entity acquiring property under the plan, and any creditor, equity security
holder, or general partner in the debtor, whether or not the claim or interest of such credi-
tor, equity security holder, or general partner is impaired under the plan and whether or
not such creditor, equity security holder, or general partner has accepted the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1988).
262. Case 308 U.S. at 121 n.15.
263. In addition, with Section 77B's extension of the discharge to dissenting claims, one func-
tion of shareholder assessments became obsolete. The reorganized debtor no longer had to pay
dissenting creditors in full to avoid a long fight over whether the reorganization plan contained a fair
offer.
264. In other words, cash is necessary only to show that the debtor's reorganization is not
likely to be followed by the need for further financial reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(a)(1 1).
265. Another possible justification for the necessity rule is to prevent owners from playing
valuation games with the debtor. This concern is addressed through the overbid mechanism dis-
cussed below. See text accompanying notes 309-315 infra.
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discarded.
3. The preservation of new value concepts.
As previously indicated, the process by which a plan of reorganization is
confirmed is analogous to an auction for control of the reorganized
debtor.266 Participants initially bid by proposing a plan. The plan, in turn,
sets the consideration that each class of claims receives, and identifies the
new owners. The court's role is to confirm the winning bid.
Viewing plan confirmation as an auction provides the first step in analyz-
ing the role of the owner, and a basis for rethinking Case. A new value plan
is simply a bid in the auction for control of the reorganized debtor, proposed
by holders of prepetition interests, which leaves some class paid less than in
full, and which does not require creditor consent.267 Any other plan is sim-
ply another bid.
The best bid should win the auction. This still leaves undetermined ex-
actly what the best bid is, or should be. Two means of evaluation exist. As
in Case, a court can make the decision, taking into account, but not being
bound by, creditor preferences. Alternatively, creditor preferences alone can
control. The Code answers this question. It requires courts to defer to cred-
itor preferences when more than one competing plan qualifies for confirma-
tion.268 Given this background, methods and procedures which provide
incentives for the promulgation of competing creditor plans accomplish two
goals: they increase the number and amount of bids; and they provide credi-
tors with alternatives beyond those offered by the debtor.
With this in mind, I offer the following standard for owner participation.
It is consistent with both the Code and, except for the necessity requirement,
with Case. A holder of a prepetition equity interest satisfies the fair and
equitable requirement if it proposes a plan in which it retains or receives an
equity interest in the reorganized debtor, without payment in full of all cred-
itors, only if it sustains the burden of showing that: (1) it will contribute
money or money's worth to the debtor; and (2) the value of the interest
retained or received in the reorganized debtor will be no greater than the
value of the contribution.
In addition, this standard needs to be augmented by revised procedural
rules to equalize the bargaining positions of the parties. If owners submit a
new value plan, exclusivity terminates. Second, a competing plan proponent
will not be required to prove reorganization value to eliminate the class pro-
266. See text accompanying notes 229-241 supra.
267. Under the Code, a plan proponent must request nonconsensual confirmation. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(1). As a result, it will be relatively easy to ascertain if a plan proponent requests confirma-
tion without relying on the assent of all classes.
268. Section 1129(c) provides that if more than one plan is confirmable, "the court shall con-
sider the preferences of creditors and equity security holders in determining which plan to confirm."
Id. § 1129 (c). This language can be interpreted as giving equal weight to creditor and owner prefer-
ences. But as it pertains to insolvent debtors, such a reading runs contrary to the intent of the
absolute priority rule, and is also contrary to the holdings of the few cases which construe the sec-
tion. See notes 306-307 infra.
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posing the new value plan. Finally, if any creditor or class of creditors there-
after proposes a plan that gains creditor acceptance, then that creditor plan
will be confirmed.
This first part of the owner participation test does not substantively differ
from Case's dicta. It requires the contribution of money or money's worth,
and follows the exchange principle set forth in Group of Institutional Inves-
tors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St Paul & Pacific Railroad,269 to set the parame-
ters of this requirement. Courts should test the financial equivalence of the
proffered contribution against this standard: an owner cannot use prop-
erty270 with transitory value as the basis of its exchange with its creditors.
After all, the owner's contribution is being exchanged for the creditors' sur-
render of their claims to the debtor.
Three examples-cash, promises of future labor, and offers to guarantee
postconfirmation debt-illustrate the operation of the exchange principle.
With cash, the enduring quality of the property is clear. It is thus an accept-
able form of new value. As noted in Ahlers, the fleeting quality of an unen-
forceable promise of future labor is unacceptable.27 1 Offers to guaranty
postconfirmation debt illustrate the application of the exchange principle to
forms of property less tangible than cash, but more tangible than a promise
of future labor.272 A guaranty may differ from a promise of future labor
because, like a promissory note, it has value to the extent of the creditworthi-
ness of its backer.273 As a result, if an owner's guaranty of postconfirmation
debt has value which can be translated into money or money's worth, it may
qualify.274 The determination, however, should proceed on a case by case
269. 318 U.S. 523, 563 (1943); see text accompanying note 110 supra (discussing the exchange
principle).
270. The term "property" has an expansive usage inappropriate to the new value context.
Unsecured claims may receive "property," which is used in its broadest sense, as long as
the present value of the property given to the holders of unsecured claims is equal to the
allowed amount of the claims. Some kinds of property, such as securities, may require
difficult valuations by the court; in such circumstances the court need only determine that
there is a reasonable likelihood that the property given the dissenting class of impaired
unsecured claims equals the present value of such allowed claims.
124 CONG. REc. 32,407-08 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); id 34,007 (statement of Sen.
DeConcini); see also Ahler, 485 U.S. at 208 (noting that although the term "property" is not de-
fined, "the relevant legislative history suggests that Congress' meaning was quite broad"); H.R. REP.
No. 595, supra note 105, at 413 (" '[P]roperty' includes both tangible and intangible property.").
271. Ahler% 485 U.S. at 204-05.
272. See, eg., note 170 supra.
273. Although guaranties are property that is often exchanged, their value in any particular
case may be suspect. Lessons from fraudulent transfer law tell us that guaranties cannot be valued at
their face amount; there must be some discount given for the probability of payment by the principle
debtor. See, eg., In re Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that
probability that guaranty will not be called upon reduces valuation of guaranty for insolvency pur-
poses).
There is also an obvious tension, noted earlier at note 160 supra, between new value as inter-
preted in connection with the fair and equitable requirement, and new value as defined in I 1 U.S.C.
§ 547(a)(2) (1988).
274. In re Pullman Constr. Indus. Inc., 107 B.R. 909 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989), dealt with the
proffer of a guaranty as new value. It stated that a "guarantee of a post-petition line of credit has
some value, but it is not a substantial present contribution of money or money's worth because it
represents a contribution promised in the future." Id. at 949. The court's holding is broad enough to
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basis. 2 7 5
The second part of the owner participation test-measuring the value of
the interest retained or received against the value of the contribution-also
draws upon Case. As shown above2 76 and in Appendix A,277 any require-
ment of equivalence between the value of the interest retained and the value
of the contribution made is congruent with the absolute priority rule. As a
consequence, any plan which complies with the test stated above or the test
as stated in Case will return, by definition, to creditors at least the reorgani-
zation value of the debtor.278 This satisfies the absolute priority rule.
These requirements for owner participation flow from basic rules for the
conduct of an auction. An owner must support its bid with consideration;
and the contribution of money or money's worth satisfies that requirement.
Further, the buyer must pay the consideration to the seller; the requirement
of reasonable equivalence fills this bill. Auction theory, however, enables us
to go beyond this position. It permits the construction of rules that promote
the conduct of a fair auction, in which the seller receives maximum revenue.
The final portion of the owner participation test incorporates procedural
safeguards against unfair exploitation by owners of their special position.279
encompass the guaranty of a commercial surety, which, if bought by the owner, could constitute
"money or money's worth." At best, the court was discounting the guaranty according to the
court's view of the creditworthiness of the guarantor.
275. Some interpretive benefit can be gleaned from the federal tax lien statute which provides
that the government's lien takes priority over all subsequent interests. 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1988).
There are exceptions, however, for holders of subsequently-arising security interests or subsequent
purchasers who part with "money or money's worth." Id. § 6323(h)(1) (definition of security inter-
est); id § 6323(h)(6) (definition of purchase). Under these definitions, past consideration is not
money or money's worth, United States v. Phillips, 715 F. Supp. 81, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), although
uncompensated services can be. Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(h)-l(a)(3) (1990). Compare Horowitz v.
Kaplan, (In re Waltham Watch) 193 F.2d 64, 73-75 (1st Cir. 1951), cerL denied, 342 U.S. 946 (1952)
(allowing manager of debtor to exchange uncompensated past services for plan consideration) with
In re C.P.M. Constr., 124 B.R. 335, 339-40 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1991) (holding that post-petition, pre-
confirmation claim of owner for wages equal to difference between market wages and actual pay did
not constitute new value under 4hlers).
276. See text accompanying notes 184-199 supra.
277. See text accompanying notes 316-322 infra.
278. The proposed test does not require that owners make any "minimum"' ontribution.
Some courts disagree, believing that a minimum nexus between the amount contributed and the debt
extinguished is essential. See, eg., In re Kendavis Indus. Int'l, Inc., 91 B.R. 742, 749 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1988) (deeming proffered contribution of $5,000,000 insubstantial in light of $500,000,000 in
outstanding debt); Travelers Ins. v. Olson (In re Olson), 80 B.R. 935, 937 (Bankr. C.D. nl. 1987)
(finding that contribution which would lead to 1.56% dividend is insubstantial). The requirement of
reasonable equivalence, however, subsumes this minimum contribution test, as creditors will receive
the reorganization value of the debtor. After that, their interest in the continuing debtor is well
protected by other confirmation conditions, most notably feasibility. Under the Code, feasibility
requires the plan proponent to show that confirmation is not likely to be followed by the need for
further reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1 1) (1988). If full reorganization value is to be returned
to creditors, then the contribution by the debtor will equal, at least on an accounting basis, the total
net worth of the reorganized, debtor. Traditional notions of appropriate capitalization allow credi-
tors and courts to test whether the proffered contribution will provide the reorganized debtor with
sufficient capital to thrive. Another way of stating the issue is that any requirement of "substantial-
ity" duplicates the "feasibility" requirement. Since creditors receive full reorganization value, there
is no need to test this desiderata twice.
279. Indeed, Boyd was concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with such procedural safe-
guards. Its strategy was to impose the burden of promulgating and proving a fair offer on plan
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C. Exclusivity, Valuation, and Creditor Preferences: Reduction of Entry
Fees
The Code gives owners the ability to block the filing of competing plans
during the initial phases of the case,280 as well as a limited power to classify
creditors. 281 It also restricts who may file a plan to "parties in interest, '282
thus narrowing the field of prospective bidders. The practical effect of these
powers is that owners may effectively control the field of prospective bidders.
But the power to exclude is an emolument of ownership. As such, under a
strict reading of Boyd, it is an incident of control of the debtor, to which
creditors have first priority.283 But Congress made a policy choice against
strict absolute priority and in favor of allocating these powers to debtors.
This policy choice, at least as it affects insolvent debtors, can lead to situa-
tions in which a creditor's perceived cost of filing and confirming a compet-
ing plan increases or greatly reduces the anticipated gain. In the process,
therefore, owners will have succeeded in capturing for themselves some of
the debtor's value.
Under the current system, creditors bear costs not borne by owners.
These costs include the lawyers' fees in seeking termination of exclusivity,
and possibly some costs entailed in proving the debtor's value. These costs
bear a similarity to entry fees in auctions.284 In auctions, however, entry fees
screen serious from frivolous bidders. 285 In reorganizations, the other costs
inherent in proposing and confirming a plan amply satisfy that criterion.286
proponents. If a creditor did not participate in a fair offer, it was left without a remedy. See text
accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
280. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (1988).
281. Id. §§ 1122 (stating the standard for classification); id § 1123(a)(1) (requiring plans to
classify all claims).
282. Id § 1121(c). Some courts have expansively defined "party in interest." See, eg., In re
First Humanics Corp., 124 B.R. 87, 90-91 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991) (holding that pre-petition man-
ager of debtor is a party in interest); In re River Bend-Oxford Assocs., 114 B.R. 111, 114-16 (Bankr.
D. Md. 1990) (holding that partners in limited partnership, which was one of two general partners in
the debtor, were parties in interest). In addition, many courts now hold that a purchase of a pre-
petition claim is sufficient to imbue party in interest status. In re First Humanics Corp., 124 B.R. at
91-92; In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282, 286 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990); In re American 3001
Telecommunications, Inc., 79 B.R 271, 272 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).
283. Boyd stated that creditors were entitled to whatever value inhered in the debtor, whether
"it was present or prospective, for dividends or only for purposes of control. In either event it was a
right of property out of which the creditors were entitled to be paid before the stockholders could
retain it for any purpose whatever." 228 U.S. at 508 (emphasis added). Case reiterated this point in
establishing the initial contours of the absolute priority rule. 308 U.S. at 116.
284. Auction theory has studied the effect of entry fees upon seller's revenue and upon the
optimal form of auction. See eg., Kenneth R. French & Robert E. McCormick, Sealed Bids, Sunk
Costs, and the Process of Competition, 57 J. Bus. 417 (1984); R. Preston McAffee & John McMillan,
Auctions With Entry, 23 ECON. LETERS 343 (1987); William F. Samuelson, Competitive Bidding
with Entry Costs, 17 ECON. LETrERS 53 (1985); see also Piedmont Assocs. v. CIGNA Property &
Casualty Ins. Co., CIV. A.:91-CVI840JOF, 1991 WL 193700, at *3 (owner's ability to "create and
structure the reorganization plan" allowed owner to unfairly propose purchase ownership interest in
reorganized debtor); In re Outlook/Century Ltd., 127 B.R. 650 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991) (same).
285. See R. CASSADY, JR., supra note 233, at 79-80.
286. In addition, any plan proponent must demonstrate that its plan is proposed in good faith
as part of its basic confirmation requirements. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (1988).
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Moreover, entry fees tend to depress the final bid price, since external
bidders will deduct their costs of preparing a bid from their final bid.287
Reduction or elimination of these costs will thus tend to increase the final
bids and creditor dividends. 288 It is therefore appropriate to reduce or elimi-
nate procedures and practices that explicitly or implicitly impose entry fees
upon nonowner bids.
1. Termination of exclusivity.
Exclusivity refers to the debtor's statutory right28 9 to exclude others
from filing plans of reorganization during the first 120 days of a bankruptcy
case. This 120-day period is often extended, 290 especially in large reorgani-
zations, 291 but it also may be shortened or terminated for cause.292 This
section argues that the filing of a new value plan constitutes such cause.
The power to control the identity and status of plan proponents includes
the power to initiate negotiations on possible postconfirmation capital struc-
tures. Such power is considerable. If one assumes that creditors' returns are
time sensitive, then the ability to impose delays allocates at least the time
value of that delay to the debtor. This amount is simply an indirect, albeit
real, entry fee. Creditors must wait out the debtor to achieve equality in
bargaining positions. The same result would occur if creditors paid the
debtor the time value of the delay and then immediately filed a plan.
Second, automatic termination of exclusivity2 93 whenever owners pro-
pose a new value plan would equalize the parties' bargaining positions. If
creditors can file a competing plan without incurring the cost of fighting
exclusivity, they no longer need to deduct such cost from their bid to achieve
their desired profit. Termination of exclusivity can thereby provide a potent
check on owners' latitude with respect to the initial setting of reorganization
287. French & McCormick, supra note 284, at 417-23; McAfee & McMillan, supra note 284, at
344.
Auction theory also has examined the ultimate effect of reserve prices; that is, the setting of the
minimum price a seller will accept. E.g., Milgrom & Weber, supra note 238, at 1111 & n.25. The
result of this examination is that the optimum reserve price is "the average of the seller's own valua-
tion and the highest possible valuation that a bidder could have." McAfee & McMillan, supra note
198, at 714. In the reorganization context, the liquidation value is the initial reserve price; no plan
may be confirmed without unanimous creditor consent unless it returns to creditors at least the
liquidation value of the company. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1988). Once owners propose a new
value plan, the consideration set forth in it becomes the reserve price, although there may be situa-
tions in which creditors may bid less, such as when the owners' plan is based on unrealistic assump-
tions that could not have been confirmed even in the absence of a creditor plan.
For a similar insight in the area of contested tender offers, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982).
288. French & McCormick, supra note 284, at 438-39.
289. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b).
290. Before an extension is granted, cause must be shown. Id. § 1121(d).
291. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bank-
ruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 128 (1990).
292. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d).
293. Technically, what is terminated is the exclusive right to file a plan during the first 120
days after a filing, id § 1121(c)(2), and to solicit creditor votes during the first 60 days after the
debtor files its plan, id. § 1121(c)(3).
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value and plan structure. If creditors disagree with the amount of value
allocated to them under the plan, they may automatically propose their own
plan, thus neutralizing owners' use of their control of the debtor.
The text of the Code and judicial precedent both support categorizing
the filing of a new value plan as sufficient "cause" to terminate exclusivity.
294
If the debtor proposes a new value plan, then by definition it has admitted its
insolvency because it is proposing to pay its creditors less than the full
amount of their claims. It is also stepping back from consensual readjust-
ment of its capital structure; owners seek confirmation of a new value plan
over the dissent of an unpaid class. In such circumstances, allowing owners
to perpetuate their control of the debtor by excluding creditor action violates
Boyd's holding that the absolute priority rule protects incidents of owner-
ship such as control. The filing of a new value plan and its concomitant
admission of insolvency thus provides ample "cause" to terminate
exclusivity.295
This result is also supported by the fact that exclusivity with respect to
plans subject to the fair and equitable requirement is a Code innovation.296
Exclusivity was not relevant in Chapter X cases under the Act because a
trustee was often in charge, and Chapter XI cases were not subject to the fair
and equitable rule. As a consequence, courts have not had to grapple with
the intersection of exclusivity and absolute priority. If Boyd remains good
law, however, it is difficult to square the exercise of exclusivity when what is
being debated is the confirmation of a nonconsensual, new value plan.
2. No proof of reorganization value.
Aside from the costs of terminating exclusivity, creditors face other dis-
guised entry fees. One of the key motivations for compromise in Chapter 11
reorganizations is the daunting task of proving reorganization value.297 The
fair and equitable standard requires such a showing every time a plan pro-
poses to eliminate any class of claims or interests.298 If creditors propose a
competing plan under the proposed model, then such a plan will likely elimi-
294. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d); In re Public Serv. Co., 88 B.R. 521, 537 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988); In re
Crescent Beach Inn, 22 B.R. 155 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982).
295. Cf United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 376
(1988) (suggesting that a debtor's inability to propose a consensual plan in less than a year may be
cause to terminate exclusivity).
296. Exclusivity previously existed only in Chapter XI arrangements under the Act. COMMIs-
SION REPORT, supra note 116, pt. 1, at 244. Chapter XI was not subject to the fair and equitable
rule. See note 152 supra.
297. Broude, supra note 11, at 453-54.
298. Although the conclusion is noncontroversial, the mechanism for enforcement is complex.
Under the Code, a class of claims or interests that is eliminated under a plan is deemed to have
rejected the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(g) (1988). For example, if a creditor plan eliminates all pre-
petition equity interests, the creditor does not need to solicit the votes of holders of those interests.
The Code presumes rejection. Since at least one class has rejected the proposed plan, the plan propo-
nent must then confirm, if at all, under § 1129(b), which allows confirmation notwithstanding the
failure to receive the affirmative votes of all impaired classes. Id. § 1129(b)(1). If requested, how-
ever, such cramdown require compliance with the fair and equitable requirement, id, which in turn
requires a showing that no creditor is being paid more than in full.
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nate or reduce the owners' interests. Creditors can convert their investment
into the necessary consideration only through such dilution or elimination.
Paradoxically, owners could force creditors to prove reorganization value
merely by asserting that their interests could not be eliminated without proof
of such value.
The proof of reorganization value is fraught with uncertainty. Reorgani-
zation value is elastic and easily manipulated. As the Bankruptcy Commis-
sion noted: "By a slight change of the capitalization rate, an insolvent
company in which equity security holders are denied participation becomes
a solvent company in which equity security holders are entitled to an inter-
est." 299 Boyd's creation of a "fixed principle" was intended to avoid the va-
garies of valuation.
Further, bankruptcy valuation rules consciously spurn market-based val-
uations. Reorganization value is intended to be systematically higher than
any real-life valuation.30° This protects junior classes and ensures that any
transfer of ownership based upon lack of value is free of any taint of the
bankruptcy proceeding. In other words, if all other confirmation require-
ments are met, there should be no discount in value due to a company's past
failures, which in turn will adversely and disproportionately affect junior
classes.
Use of reorganization value in the new value context is ironic. One justi-
fication for the new value rule is that owners should not be worse off than
third parties who wish to propose a plan.30' But use of reorganization value
actually gives owners an edge. They can propose a plan based on market
values302 while simultaneously opposing a creditor plan using higher reor-
ganization value.
The obvious response is to move from a system based on reorganization
value to one in which market price dominates. 303 In such a system, the price
that interested parties will pay controls. This market-based approach is also
299. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 116, pt. 1, at 257.
300. When the debtor is able to discharge prepetition debt with long-term obligations, adroit
owners can arrogate to themselves most of the value of any increase in the debtor's value, yet dele-
gate most of the risk of future operations necessary for that increase to the debtor's creditors. See
Note, supra note 119, at 1793.
301. See text accompanying notes 222-227 supra.
302. It appears that new value cases adopt a market value approach to test the "reasonable
equivalence" of the consideration. See, ag., Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. v.
U.S. Truck Co., Inc. (In re U.S. Truck Co., Inc.), 800 F.2d 581, 588 (6th Cir. 1986) (approving
debtor's contribution of $100,000 as reasonably equivalent in light of risk that debtor's labor troubles
could impair worth of ownership interest, notwithstanding the fact that the debtor was earning over
$100,000 per month); Official Creditors' Comm. ex reL Class 8 Unsecured Creditors v. Potter Mate-
rial Serv., Inc., (In re Potter Material Serv., Inc.), 781 F.2d 99, 104 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming trial
court's consideration of" 'past earnings record, the state of the economy, the highly competitive
nature of the [d]ebtor's business, the present financial position of the [dlebtor, and the [diebtor's of
future earnings' " in formulating going-concern value of $10,000-$15,000); see also Piedmont Assocs.
v. CIGNA Property & Casualty Ins. Co., CIV.A.1:91-CV1840JOF, 1991 WL 193700, at *4 (new
value plan, if approved, would effectively permit owner to purchase debtor's assets "against the
wishes of existing creditors outside the public market place").
303. Klee, Cram Down II, supra note 11, at 244.
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consistent with the Code's design, which seeks to protect junior creditors
from market skepticism. With a new value plan, the owners have spoken:
their own estimate opened the bidding. To consciously tolerate two stan-
dards in such a system is unfair to creditors; it allows owners to select a low
price for their bid, while holding creditor plans to a higher standard. Equity
and auction theory again coincide to suggest a solution-The elimination of
false costs effectively reduces entry fees.
3. Tie goes to the creditor: the vindication of creditor preferences.
If the above owner participation requirements are followed, creditors
may receive two plans simultaneously. The Code expressly permits such a
result.3° 4 If creditors accept both plans, 30 5 and both otherwise meet all of
the other conditions for confirmation, then the creditor plan should win.30 6
Two other justifications for this result exist. First, since creditors have
priority in the debtor's assets, they should be able to choose the form of their
payment. An insolvent debtor's desires in this respect should not receive
much weight. 30 7 Next, plans may always be modified prior to confirma-
tion. 30 8 This permits owners to increase their bid when faced with a com-
peting plan. In this way, each successive bid will reset reorganization value.
Given the vagaries of such value, these fluctuations should come as no sur-
prise and should not be held against the debtor.
4. Credit-bids.
The elimination of disguised entry fees is only one step in facilitating
higher yields for creditors. None of the procedural rules can achieve this
goal unless nonowners can propose competing plans. In addition to outside
investors who view the debtor as a possible acquisition,3°9 creditors them-
selves should be encouraged to bid. Yet creditors often lack the inclination
304. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(c) (1988); BANKR. R 3018(c) (1991).
305. Under bankruptcy balloting procedures, a vote for one plan does not exclude voting on
others. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(c). It is thus possible that creditors will vote for their own, and for the
owners', plan.
306. In re Turner Eng'g, Inc., 109 B.R. 956, 960-61 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1989); In re Bedford
Springs Hotel, Inc., 97 B.R. 831, 834 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989); In re Rolling Green Country Club, 26
B.R. 729, 735 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982). Similarly, if there are more than two plans, creditor prefer-
ences should again control. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(c); BANKR. R. 3018(c).
307. This is not as callous as it might seem. By definition, a new value plan only exists when
the debtor is insolvent and at least one class of creditors does not agree with the owner's division of
values. Until creditors are paid in full, the owners' preferences do not count for much. See In re
Sound Radio, Inc., 93 B.R. 849, 858-59 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1988) (approving debtor's plan even though
creditors favored different plan, due to the fact that debtor's plan paid creditors in full).
308. 11 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
309. Under the Act, Chapter X trustees often found third parties willing to propose plans.
Their tie to the trustee made them a "party in interest." See, ag., In re Imperial '400' Nat'l Inc., 374
F. Supp. 949 (D.N.L 1974) (considering four plans from prospective purchasers); In re Polycast
Corp., 289 F. Supp. 707 (D. Conn. 1968) (trustee contacted over 40 companies to find acquisition
partner before sponsoring plan with debtor's management group). The demise of a disinterested
trustee gives a strange twist to the Code's requirement that only "parties in interest" may file a plan.
Owners who wish to propose a new value plan rarely will want to encourage competition, regardless
of the debtor's fiduciary duties. This tension provides yet another barrier to third-party bidding.
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or the funds to match any new value proffered by owners directly. This
perceived shortcoming, however, overlooks the reality that creditors can al-
ways convert their existing investment into equity in the new company.
Creditors could, for example, receive the same return as that proposed by
a new value plan by exchanging their debt for equity, and by canceling the
old owners' interests. In this process, the need for fresh capital can be miti-
gated by a reduction in the amount of reorganization debt allocated to the
creditors, with a concomitant increase in the equity for creditors in the reor-
ganizing debtor. For example, assume a debtor proposes a new value plan in
which unsecured creditors (the only class of creditors) receive $100 of the
$200 they are owed, and that this $100 is to be funded by a cash contribution
by the owner. Under the first procedural rule mentioned above, unsecured
creditors should be allowed to file a competing plan immediately. If that
competing plan cancels one-half of the debt in return for all of the equity of
the business, the consideration to creditors would be equivalent.310 More-
over, since the reorganized debtor would have a clean capital structure with
no outstanding debt, working capital needs could be met within the con-
straints of feasibility through working capital lines of credit.311
This suggestion harkens back to the practice of credit-bidding in railroad
reorganizations. There, secured creditors effectively controlled reorganiza-
tions through their ability to credit-bid at a foreclosure. Critics of that prac-
tice argued that it depressed prices. The function of credit-bids in the
context of a new value plan, however, is more expansive, as it checks possi-
ble owner underbids rather than serving as an initial price or bid.
A credit-bid plan also has the virtue of being self-funding from the credi-
tors' perspective, since the extinguished claims, rather than provision of new
value, provide the consideration.312 A similar procedure is currently avail-
able to nonrecourse secured creditors whose property is sold pursuant to a
plan.313 Although the Code does not generally allow such creditors to re-
310. Creditors should always be able to compete. The owner's initial decision to proceed by
way of new value plan, although not determinative of insolvency, is good evidence that it exists.
Since insolvency means the amount of claims exceeds the assets, the creditors will have sufficient
bargaining power-that is, sufficient debt to exchange-in most, if not all, circumstances.
311. This may eliminate plans which assume increasing asset values. See, eg., In re FSLIC v.
D&F Constr. Co. Inc. (In re D&F Constr. Co.), 865 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1989); In re Lakeside Global
II, Ltd., 116 B.R. 499 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989). This, in turn, focuses the inquiry upon operating
efficiency, which may be salutary in effect.
312. Professor Lucian Bebchuk has recently made a similar proposal for a self-funding plan, in
which all consideration comes from the exchange and extinguishment of existing claims through an
auction process, rather than from outside value. Bebehuck, supra note 193. Professor Bebehuk's
analysis, however, follows a model in which all claims are ascertained before the auction, id. at 778,
a requirement which limits his proposal's effectiveness. The proposal considered here leads to the
same type of auction. A court will not be concerned that the participants reach some mythical
valuation; rather, it will simply manage an auction between two or more participants. The partici-
pants will then set the value of the reorganized debtor by their bids.
313. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) specifically provides that:
[a]t a sale under subsection (b) of this section of property that is subject to a lien that
secures an allowed claim, unless the court for cause orders otherwise the holder of such
claim may bid at such sale, and, if the holder of such claim purchases such property, such
holder may offset such claim against the purchase price of such property.
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ceive a claim for any deficiency, 314 the Code does recognize the possibility of
a debtor taking advantage of a low valuation and offers protection to that
creditor through the vehicle of credit-bidding. Thus, if such creditors be-
lieve that the sale price is too low, they may credit-bid their claim at a higher
amount, and purchase the property.315 The proposal presented above ex-
pands this safeguard to protect entire classes of creditors, allowing them to
credit-bid their debt to the level of reorganization value they select.
V. CONCLUSION
For over fifty years, the absolute priority rule has been the cornerstone of
reorganization practice and theory. This rule requires creditors to receive
the lesser of their claims or the reorganization value of the company before
residual owners can continue to participate. Since the Code's adoption in
1978, owners have been seduced by an alleged exception to the absolute pri-
ority rule. Under this putative exception-first established in dicta and
never reiterated until the Code's adoption-if owners contribute necessary
new value to the debtor, they may preserve their interests to the extent of
that contribution. But as shown above, labelling this rule an exception mis-
uses the term. Application of the rule only yields results consistent with the
absolute priority rule itself.
To view the new value rule as an exception to absolute priority is to
sustain debtor control in derogation of the rights of the true owners, its un-
paid creditors. New value never was tested under the Act, and has no justifi-
cation under the Code. Analysis of the rule as an exception perpetuates a
catachresis, and should cease.
Furthermore, courts' misperceptions regarding the existence of an excep-
tion have produced inconsistent and confusing results. These decisions have
failed to appreciate the fact that the Code has radically altered reorganiza-
tion strategy. The Code now allows waiver of the absolute priority rule on a
class basis, allows owners to stay in control of a debtor, potentially excludes
third party bidders from the process, and grants owners the exclusive right
The legislative history indicates that "a secured creditor may bid in the full amount of the
creditor's allowed claim including the secured portion and any unsecured portion thereof in the
event the creditor is undersecured, with respect to property that is subject to a lien that secures the
allowed claim." 124 CONG. REc. 32,396 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at 33,795 (state-
ment of Sen. DeConcini).
314. [If] property is being sold under a Chapter 11 plan, a non-recourse creditor will have
its claim reduced to the allowed secured claim as provided by Section 506(a), will lose its
unsecured claim, and can be left unimpaired if its allowed secured claim is paid in full on
the effective date of the plan.
In re Realty Invests., Ltd. V, 72 B.R. 143, 145 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987); see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 111 l(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1988).
315. The non-recourse creditor may overbid the purchase price as set forth in the plan by
means of credit bid as allowed by § 363(k). See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. California
Hancock Inc. (In re California Hancock, Inc.), 88 B.R. 226, 230-31 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988) (affirming
secured creditor's right to credit-bid regardless of which subsection of § 1129(b)(2)(A) debtor seeks
to invoke); In re Realty Investm, 72 B.R. at 146 (recognizing that since secured claim is set by value
of property, credit bid under § 363(k) effectively sets new value and thus increases secured claim); In
re Woodridge North Apts., Ltd., 71 B.R. 189, 191 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987).
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to propose a plan in the initial stages of a case. Moreover, as plan propo-
nents, owners enjoy the ability to set the tests for inclusion within any partic-
ular class.
These changes created significant benefits for equity participants in reor-
ganizing companies. As a consequence, courts should not strain to find, in
language written at a different time and during a different phase of reorgani-
zations, an exception to one of creditors' primary rights in reorganizations-
the absolute priority rule. They need not work so hard: as indicated above,
a new value exception to the absolute priority rule simply does not exist.
This conclusion, however, does not require reinstating the presumption
that owners cannot bid for their own company. A contested reorganization
is much like an auction in that participants bid for control of an asset. Auc-
tion theory suggests that owner plans could be beneficial in several respects.
First, bids by owners would increase the pool of available bidders. This
would increase competition and would place upward pressure on the final
price. Second, owner bids could provide critical information to other poten-
tial bidders as to the worth of the debtor. This information would reduce
uncertainty and would allow bidders to bid more confidently. Third, partici-
pation by residual owners is consistent with the absolute priority rule if the
residual owners pay and receive what a third party would pay and receive
for the same company. Under this test, creditors should receive, at mini-
mum, the reorganization value of a company.
Owners, however, exercise a measure of control properly belonging to
creditors when they propose a reorganization plan to the exclusion of others,
and typically possess unequal information regarding the debtor. According
to the auction analogy, owners possess a right to set entry fees which may
impede competitive bidders and depress final prices. To equalize the bar-
gaining positions and, to some extent, the informational imbalance, owners'
participation should be circumscribed by granting creditors a paramount
right to overbid on similar terms, and by disabling debtors from using statu-
tory exclusivity to fend off competing plans of reorganization. Finally, if the
creditors propose a confirmable plan which receives the affirmative vote of
creditors, courts should confirm that plan.
The final result is much like a playground split of a sandwich in which
one child cuts the sandwich while the other gets to choose which portion she
wants. Here, the debtor picks a value for the company by setting reorganiza-
tion value. The creditors may then choose what they will receive: the con-
sideration offered or the company itself. Application of this simplified
analogy may yield only rough justice. In an area in which mathematical
certainty is an illusion, however, this rough justice may be the best justice
attainable.
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APPENDIX A
ALGEBRAIC DEMONSTRATION THAT THE "EXCEPTION" IS ONLY A
SPECIAL CASE OF THE RULE
That the "exception" and the absolute priority rule yield the same result
can also be shown by algebraic means. As stated in Case, "where the debtor
is insolvent, the stockholder's participation must be based on a contribution
in money or money's worth, reasonably equivalent in view of all the circum-
stances to the participation of the stockholder. ' 3 16 If one assumes a contri-
bution of money, this sentences tells us that the amount contributed must be
"reasonably equivalent" to the stockholder's "participation." "Participa-
tion" is left undefined, but in Case, Justice Douglas found that a 23% stock
interest represented an impermissible 23% interest in the "value of the enter-
prise."'3 17 As a consequence, if we assume that "participation" equates with
or includes an ownership interest, we only need to find the value of the
debtor, apply that interest, and the result will be the value of the
participation.
These relationships can be represented algebraically. If we set:
C = the amount of the proposed capital contribution;
R = reorganization value, calculated on the basis of capitalized future
earnings;
D = the value of debt securities or instruments distributed to creditors
pursuant to the plan;
M = the value of cash or other tangible property other than debt obliga-
tions or equity securities to be distributed under the plan; and
P = the participation of the pre-petition owners, expressed as a decimal,
then the following equation represents Justice Douglas' formulation of the
"exception" to the absolute priority rule:
C = [(R +C)-(D +M)] * P
In short, the right hand side of the equation represents the value of the
owner's interest in the reorganized company. This is calculated by first ob-
taining the "value" of the company by adding the reorganization value, R,
and the proposed cash contribution, C, and by then subtracting the non-
operating charges against income represented by reorganization debt, D, and
by cash and other tangible property, M. None of C, D, or M is a component
of R; R is set by the economics of the debtor; and C, D, and M are values
selected by the plan proponent and given force by confirmation. Once this
amount is set, then the owner's share of that value is given by applying P, the
percentage the owner proposes to retain. If the owner retains 100% of the
equity interests, then P = 1, and P becomes superfluous to the equation.
Take as an example an owner of a corporation who wishes to contribute
$100 in cash to retain 100% interest in the debtor. Under the above equa-
316. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 122 (1939).
317. Id. at 119.
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tion, in order to determine the value of the interest received-that is, the
value of stock to be issued to the old shareholder under the plan-a third
valuation is required: that of R, or the value of the reorganized entity.
Note, however, that the sales price-the amount of the contribution-does
not itself determine that value.
The amount of value received, that is, the value of the stock interest the
stockholder will receive, is thus inextricably linked to the value of the reor-
ganized company. If the owner proposes to continue 100% ownership, then
this value and the value of the stock interest match: in the notation above,
R = D + M 318
Against this background, reconsider the owner who wishes to contribute
$100 and receive $100 worth of stock. Assume further that, under the prin-
ciples already outlined, R = $100. Assume also that the debtor has only one
class of pre-petition debts, and they aggregate to $200. Again, Case and the
above equation require the owner to contribute new value reasonably
equivalent to the shareholder's post-confirmation participation. To ascertain
this value, calculate the value of the reorganized debtor after the owner
makes her contribution, but before any allocation of value between owners
and creditors. The debtor had $100 of reorganization value, to which the
owner added $100 of cash. The value of the debtor, without any distribution
to creditors or issuance of any stock to owners, is thus $200. Under the
above equation this would be the sum R + C.
If all debts were discharged in order to give the reorganized company a
clean debt structure, then the value of the interest retained would equal
$200; D and M in this case would be zero. This is not, by any definition,
"reasonably equivalent" to the $100 contribution. The owner would pay
$100 (C), and receive a stock interest worth $200 (R + C).
Allocating a portion of this excess value to creditors is one method to
bring the exchange into balance. In short, making (D + M) non-zero can
bring the equation into balance. As set forth in Group of Institutional Inves-
tors,3 19 the post-confirmation value of a reorganized debtor is its gross reor-
ganization value (without any debt) less any pre-petition claims provided for
in the plan. How is (D +M) determined? In this example the answer seems
easy: $100, which could be paid to creditors in cash (M) or reorganization
securities (D). After allocation of this amount to creditors, the reorganized
debtor has a residual value of $100, which is reasonably equivalent to the
$100 the owner contributed.
This result also has one other quality: it fully complies with the absolute
priority rule. The $100 in value received by creditors equals the debtor's
318. When such valuations are made, the Supreme Court has ruled that capitalized earnings
are the appropriate test. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M. St.P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S.
523 (1943); Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 525-26 (1941); see also In re
Genesee Cement, Inc., 31 B.R. 442, 444 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrTCY
1129.03[4][fl[ii] (15th ed. 1991). See In re Jartran, Inc., 44 B.R. 331 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984) for a
modem application of these valuation techniques.
319. 318 U.S. at 541.
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reorganization value, which is the full value of the creditors' interest in the
debtor as of the date of the bankruptcy. 320
These conditions can also be expressed through algebra, using the same
variables. Recall that Justice Douglas also stated that "[a]s indicated in the
Boyd case, the creditors are entitled to have the full value of the property,
whether 'present or prospective, for dividends or only for purposes of con-
trol', first appropriated to payment of their claims. ' 321 The "full value of
the property," especially given the context of Du Bois, equates with reorgani-
zation value. Thus, this entire value must be "first appropriated" to pay-
ment of creditor claims.3 22 In short, all value must be allocated to creditors,
even though the use of long term debt instruments may ultimately delay
payment.
As a consequence, the absolute priority rule is satisfied when an amount
equal to all reorganization value is allocated to creditors. Again, property
distributed under a plan can consist of cash, debt instruments, or equity in-
terests. For an insolvent company, the condition imposed by the absolute
priority rule is that, at a minimum:
R = D +M+ I[(R +C)-(D +M)]*(l-P)
The right hand side of this equation simply states that the value of the
debt instruments, cash and the equity interests distributed to creditors under
the plan must equal reorganization value. The next term,
{[(R +C)-(D +M)]*(l -P)J, is the complementary term to the value of
the owners' retained interest expressed above. It assumes that all equity not
distributed to owners is given to creditors, thus setting the decimal percent-
age of equity ownership by creditors equal to 1-P. Again, if owners allo-
cate to themselves 100% of all equity interests, this equation states that the
value of the debt securities and cash distributed must equal reorganization
value.
If this equation is solved for C, an interesting similarity occurs. It pro-
duces exactly the same conditions for C as Justice Douglas' formulation of
the "exception" to the absolute priority rule. The derivation is shown below.
Action Taken Result
1. Original equation 1. R = D+M+f[(R +C)-
(D +M)]*(l-P)j
2. Multiply (1-P) by 2. R = D+M+I(R+C)*(1-P)-[(R .- C) -(D +M)] (D +M)*(1 -P)}
3. Multiply (R +C) and (D +M) 3. R = D+M+I(R -RP+C-CP)-
by (l-P) (D-DP+M-MP)1
4. Perform subtraction 4. R = D +M+ IR -RP+C-CP-
within brackets D +DP-M +MP)
5. Drop brackets and eliminate 5. R = R -RP+C-CP+DP+MP
D and M
320. See text accompanying notes 103-113 supra.
321. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co., 312 U.S. at 529 (citation omitted).
322. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
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6. Subtract R from each side
of the equation
7. Add RP and CP, subtract DP
and MP from each side, and
reverse sides of equation
8. Factor out P from right side
of equation
6. 0 = -RP+C-CP+DP+MP
7. C = (RP+CP)-(DP+MP)
8. C= [(R +C)-(D +M)I * P
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